Reynolds v. The City of New York

Background

Terrence Reynolds sued the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Reynolds had worked as a sewage treatment worker for the Department of Environmental Protection. He alleged that, in early 2020, he reported drug dealing, fraudulent signing of paperwork concerning chemical deliveries, and theft of personal protective equipment to supervisors and the City Equal Employment Office. He alleged that supervisors and coworkers then retaliated against him, including through harassment, a shift transfer that reduced his overtime opportunities, and his termination. He also alleged that a coworker physically attacked him.

Reynolds was terminated after an administrative hearing before the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings. After hearing testimony from twenty-five Department of Environmental Protection witnesses, the administrative law judge found that Reynolds had engaged in conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline or had committed insubordination on twelve occasions, and recommended termination. The administrative law judge also found that Reynolds’s colleagues had not conspired against him. The Department of Environmental Protection Commissioner adopted the report, and Reynolds did not challenge that determination.

Collateral estoppel

The City argued that Reynolds could not relitigate issues decided in the administrative proceeding. The court explained that collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, can prevent a party from relitigating an issue that was actually and finally decided in an earlier proceeding after a full and fair opportunity to litigate it.

The court rejected the City’s argument as to Reynolds’s retaliation claim. The administrative hearing decided whether Reynolds had engaged in misconduct warranting discipline; it did not decide whether the City retaliated against him for reporting illegalities and workplace health and safety issues. For example, the administrative law judge made no findings relevant to Reynolds’s allegation that he was transferred to the day shift in retaliation for his reports. The court also explained that whether the City retaliated against Reynolds was a legal issue outside the administrative hearing’s scope.

The court noted, however, that if Reynolds sought to argue that he had not committed the misconduct found by the administrative law judge, he was precluded from making that argument.

First Amendment retaliation claim

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Reynolds had to allege that his speech was protected, that the City took an adverse action against him, and that the adverse action was connected to his speech. For a public employee’s speech to receive First Amendment protection, the employee generally must have spoken as a citizen about a matter of public concern rather than speaking as part of ordinary job responsibilities.

The court held that Reynolds’s amended complaint did not plausibly allege speech on a matter of public concern. Although he alleged that he reported drug dealing, fraudulent paperwork, and theft of protective equipment, he did not provide enough facts to support an inference that the reported conduct threatened public welfare. His allegations that the conduct endangered public health and safety were conclusory, and he did not identify specific effects on public health or safety.

The court also concluded that the allegations indicated Reynolds was reporting workplace matters as an employee rather than speaking as a citizen. His complaints concerned issues that directly affected him, and he appeared to have reported them only to supervisors and the City Equal Employment Office. The court stated that those internal employment channels were not channels generally available to members of the public.

The amended complaint also included a conclusory reference to discrimination based on sex or gender, but the court found no factual allegations supporting that assertion and noted that the reference appeared to contain a typographical error.

Disposition

The court granted the City’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice because Reynolds had already amended once after the City identified the same pleading deficiency, and the court concluded that another amendment would be futile. The Clerk was directed to terminate the open motions and close the case.