Tatas v. Ali Baba's Terrace, Inc.

Background

Mehmet Emin Tatas sued Ali Baba’s Terrace, Inc., Ali Riza Dogan, Senol Bakir, and Tolgahan Subakan over alleged discrimination during his employment at the restaurant. Tatas alleged discrimination and a hostile work environment based on his Kurdish ethnicity and a basal cell carcinoma on his nose. The opinion states that Dogan owned and was president of Ali Baba’s, Bakir was the kitchen manager, and Subakan was a chef. Tatas began working as a waiter in November 2011 and was fired in May 2016.

The defendants previously moved for partial summary judgment, which is a request to resolve claims without a trial when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact. On March 31, 2022, the court granted summary judgment on the Title VII claims as time-barred and on the disability-discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law. The court denied summary judgment on the claims against Bakir and Subakan based on insufficient service, the race and national-origin discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the two New York laws, the hostile-work-environment claims under those laws, and the back-pay claim.

Motion for Reconsideration

The defendants moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 as to the race and national-origin discrimination claims, the hostile-work-environment claims, and the back-pay claim. A motion for reconsideration asks the court to revisit an earlier ruling because it allegedly overlooked controlling law or facts that could have changed the result. The court described reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.

Tatas conceded that the demotion claim had been raised in error and withdrew it. The court therefore did not address that claim.

Discrimination Claims

The defendants argued that Tatas was too late to assert a discriminatory-demotion claim, that there was no actionable factual dispute about Dogan’s Kurdish identity, and that the court had failed to complete the three-step burden-shifting framework used in some employment-discrimination cases. Under that framework, a plaintiff first presents evidence supporting an inference of discrimination; the defendant then identifies a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action; and the plaintiff may show that reason was a pretext, meaning a stated reason masking discrimination.

On reconsideration, the court found that there was no genuine dispute that Dogan is Kurdish. It nevertheless held that this fact was not material because a person who belongs to a protected group can still discriminate against another member of that group. The court also rejected the argument that it had improperly stopped its burden-shifting analysis. Because the defendants had not shown the absence of a genuine dispute about whether Tatas presented evidence of discriminatory intent, the court said it properly ended the analysis at that stage. The court added that disputed facts about the defendants’ reasons for terminating Tatas and whether those reasons were pretextual would independently have prevented summary judgment.

Hostile Work Environment Claims

The defendants argued that the alleged harassment could not be attributed to Ali Baba’s and asked the court to reconsider its analysis of the hostile-work-environment claims. The court declined to revisit whether the alleged harassment was connected to Tatas’s national origin. It also rejected the defendants’ argument that Ali Baba’s had provided a reasonable complaint procedure and had responded appropriately to complaints. The court stated that Tatas had presented significant admissible evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could decide in his favor. It found no overlooked facts and denied reconsideration on this issue.

Back Pay

The defendants argued that Tatas had no back-pay damages because they said he earned $31,167.60 annually after termination, compared with $29,069.84 annually while working at Ali Baba’s. Tatas argued that the relevant comparison was approximately $48,000 per year he would have earned had he not been terminated. The parties also disputed how much Tatas had earned during his employment. The court declined to reconsider its earlier decision not to resolve at summary judgment whether unemployment benefits should be deducted from any back-pay award. Because material facts remained disputed, the court held that summary judgment had properly been denied on the back-pay claim.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration and directed the Clerk to terminate the motion.