Desiderio v. Hudson Technologies, Inc.

Background

Staryl Desiderio sued Hudson Technologies, Inc. and Brian Coleman. She alleged seven claims: Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) interference, FMLA retaliation, disability and gender discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), disability and gender discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), and breach of contract. The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint plausibly states a legal claim, to dismiss Counts One through Six. They did not move to dismiss Count Seven, the breach-of-contract claim.

Desiderio alleged that she took medical leave after developing panic attacks, anxiety, depression, and insomnia. She alleged that Hudson did not tell her whether her leave was approved, when it began, or when it would expire. Hudson paid her available paid time off until August 21, 2021, and later told her that her FMLA leave had expired and that she had effectively resigned by not returning to work. She also alleged that Coleman treated her harshly during a June 9, 2021 meeting in Hudson’s Long Island City office and that a male vice-president-level employee had been allowed to remain on paid leave for approximately one year.

Court’s Analysis

For purposes of the motion, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in Desiderio’s favor. It emphasized that a motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the allegations, not whether the plaintiff will ultimately win.

FMLA interference — Count One. The court denied dismissal. The FMLA provides eligible employees with unpaid, job-protected leave for specified medical and family reasons. The court concluded that failing to provide information about when FMLA leave would begin could interfere with an employee’s ability to use that leave. If Hudson had properly identified the start date, Desiderio might have been able to avoid using her FMLA leave at the same time as her paid time off and potentially extend her leave. The court therefore found the interference allegations sufficient at the pleading stage.

FMLA retaliation — Count Two. The court granted dismissal. Desiderio alleged that Hudson terminated her in retaliation for requesting FMLA leave, but the court found that the roughly three-month period between her request for leave and the termination, without additional supporting facts, did not create a plausible inference of retaliatory intent. The court also noted that an employer may replace an employee who does not return when FMLA leave ends, so long as the employer is not doing so to punish the employee for exercising FMLA rights.

Gender discrimination — Counts Four and Six. The court denied dismissal of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL gender-discrimination claims. Although Desiderio was living in Florida when her employment ended, the court explained that a nonresident may bring these claims when the discriminatory conduct’s impact is felt in New York or New York City. The court found that Desiderio adequately alleged that she experienced gender-based mistreatment during a meeting at Hudson’s Long Island City office. It held that this allegation was enough at the pleading stage for both gender-discrimination claims to continue.

Disability discrimination — Counts Three and Five. The court granted dismissal of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL disability-discrimination claims. The alleged New York meetings occurred before Desiderio’s medical conditions began, and the complaint did not allege that she experienced the impact of disability discrimination in New York. The court therefore found that the complaint did not adequately connect the alleged disability discrimination to New York or New York City.

Disposition

Judge Ramos granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Counts Two, Three, and Five, and denied it with respect to Counts One, Four, and Six. The court dismissed Counts Two, Three, and Five without prejudice, meaning Desiderio could seek to replead them. The court directed her to file an amended complaint, if any, by February 3, 2023. Count Seven, the breach-of-contract claim, was not at issue in this opinion.