Miller-Sethi v. City University of New York

Background

Faith Miller-Sethi, who identifies as a Black woman of African-American descent, was hired in January 2019 as a clinical professor and course director at the City University of New York School of Medicine. Her position involved teaching, supervising students, and coordinating student field placements. After an initial appointment, she was reappointed once. The school later declined to reappoint her, and her employment ended on August 26, 2020.

Miller-Sethi alleged that administrators and students treated her differently because of her race. Among other allegations, she said that administrators criticized and scrutinized her more heavily than non-Black faculty, imposed additional teaching and reporting demands, denied her conference funding, accepted or failed to address racially charged student conduct, and relied on allegedly false reprimands and performance criticisms when deciding not to reappoint her. She also alleged that she complained to university officials about racial mistreatment and was later subjected to retaliation.

The amended complaint asserted three types of claims against CUNY under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: race and color discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. It also asserted similar claims against Dani McBeth, Nancy Sohler, and Erica Friedman under federal civil-rights statutes and New York State and New York City human-rights laws.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court treated the complaint’s factual allegations as true and asked whether they plausibly supported liability. For the employment-discrimination claims, Miller-Sethi did not have to prove her case or plead every element required at trial; she needed to allege facts supporting at least a minimal inference that discrimination or retaliation motivated an adverse employment action.

Title VII claims against CUNY

The court denied the motion as to Miller-Sethi’s disparate-treatment claim. The court found that the school’s decision not to reappoint her was an adverse employment action and that her allegations about non-Black faculty who allegedly received less discipline despite similar conduct provided enough support for a plausible inference that race or color was a motivating factor. The court described this showing as “barely” sufficient and left the more detailed comparison of employees for discovery and possibly a jury.

The court also denied the motion as to the Title VII retaliation claim. Miller-Sethi alleged that she made several complaints about racial discrimination, that CUNY knew about them, and that the school declined to reappoint her about three months after her January 2020 complaint. The court held that the timing and the alleged inaccuracies or discriminatory basis of the performance criticisms were enough at the pleading stage to support an inference that retaliation was the required “but-for” cause of the non-reappointment decision.

The court dismissed the Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. It held that the alleged incidents involving a student, administrators’ responses, and student feedback were not objectively severe or pervasive enough to change the conditions of employment. The court characterized the principal incidents as episodic rather than continuous and found that the alleged racially coded comments and student feedback did not meet the required severity threshold.

Title VI claims against CUNY

The court granted the motion as to all three Title VI claims. Title VI generally prohibits race, color, or national-origin discrimination in programs receiving federal financial assistance, but employment claims require an alleged connection between the federal funding and the provision of employment. The court held that Miller-Sethi alleged only that CUNY received federal funding, without alleging that the funding was primarily intended to provide employment. The court also declined to apply her proposed alternative theory based on a connection between employment discrimination and discrimination against program beneficiaries.

Section 1981 claims against the individual defendants

The court granted the motion as to all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. It held that § 1981 does not provide a separate remedy against state actors when 42 U.S.C. § 1983 supplies the required mechanism for enforcing those rights. The court rejected Miller-Sethi’s argument that her request for prospective injunctive relief allowed the standalone § 1981 claims to continue.

Section 1983 claims against the individual defendants

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against a person who, acting under state authority, violates rights secured by federal law. The parties did not dispute that the individual defendants acted under state authority in their CUNY roles. The court therefore focused on whether each defendant was personally involved in the alleged violations.

The court dismissed the § 1983 hostile-work-environment claims because the allegations were not severe or pervasive enough, for the same reason the parallel Title VII claim failed.

The court allowed the § 1983 disparate-treatment claim against Sohler to proceed. Miller-Sethi alleged that Sohler prepared a feedback letter and annual review containing false or misleading criticisms, that those criticisms helped justify the non-reappointment decision, and that Sohler treated similarly situated non-Black employees more favorably.

The court dismissed the § 1983 disparate-treatment claim against McBeth. The allegations concerning McBeth’s handling of one student did not amount to a materially adverse employment action, and McBeth’s membership on the Executive Faculty Committee did not by itself show personal involvement in the non-reappointment decision.

The court allowed the § 1983 disparate-treatment claim against Friedman to proceed. Miller-Sethi alleged that she informed Friedman that the January 13 letter reflected inaccurate and disparate treatment and that Friedman failed to take remedial action. The court found those allegations sufficient at this stage.

The court dismissed the § 1983 retaliation claims against all three individual defendants. It held that Miller-Sethi had not adequately alleged that Sohler, McBeth, or Friedman was personally involved in the decision not to reappoint her. Committee membership alone was insufficient to establish that connection.

New York State and New York City claims

The court granted the motion as to all claims under the New York State Human Rights Law. Miller-Sethi pleaded those claims against the individual defendants under an aiding-and-abetting theory, but she did not assert corresponding New York State Human Rights Law claims against CUNY. Because employer liability was required as the predicate for the aiding-and-abetting claims, the court held that the individual claims could not proceed.

The court also granted the motion as to all claims under the New York City Human Rights Law. It did not decide the substance of the defendants’ sovereign-immunity argument because Miller-Sethi did not address that defense in her opposition. The court treated the claims as abandoned on that basis.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Against CUNY, the Title VII disparate-treatment and retaliation claims survived, while the Title VII hostile-work-environment claim and all Title VI claims were dismissed. Against Sohler and Friedman, only the § 1983 disparate-treatment claims survived. All claims against McBeth were dismissed, and McBeth was terminated as a party. The defendants were ordered to answer the remaining claims within 21 days after the opinion and order.