Marshall v. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Background

Cedric Marshall sued The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Bryan Matthews, Craig Carlson, Sean Gallagher, John Tone, and John or Jane Doe 1-10. The order concerns Marshall’s federal malicious-prosecution claim under Section 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, based on the Fourth Amendment.

In an earlier order, the late Judge William Pauley granted summary judgment for the defendants on this claim. Summary judgment is a ruling without a trial when the court concludes that the governing law and undisputed facts require judgment for one side. Judge Pauley concluded that dismissal of Marshall’s criminal case on speedy-trial grounds was not a favorable termination because it did not affirmatively indicate Marshall’s innocence.

Reason for Reconsideration

At the February 2, 2023, final pretrial conference, Marshall moved for permission to submit the federal malicious-prosecution claim to the jury. He relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson v. Clark, which held that a plaintiff bringing a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under Section 1983 need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction to establish a favorable termination.

Judge Liman determined that Thompson was an intervening change in controlling law. The court therefore reconsidered the earlier ruling and vacated the portion of Judge Pauley’s order that had granted summary judgment to the defendants on Marshall’s federal malicious-prosecution claim.

Remaining Issue for Trial

The defendants argued that the claim still should not go to the jury because Marshall could not establish another required element: a post-arraignment restraint on liberty sufficient to constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that federal law requires this element for a federal malicious-prosecution claim, while state law does not.

The defendants had not moved for summary judgment on that ground, so Marshall had not had an opportunity to respond to it. Judge Liman therefore would not prevent Marshall from presenting the claim to the jury. At trial, Marshall must establish that the trespass charge caused a greater deprivation of liberty than the charges for which probable cause existed. If he fails to do so, the defendants may ask the court for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.

Disposition

The court vacated the portion of the earlier order granting summary judgment to the defendants on the federal malicious-prosecution claim and did not preclude Marshall from presenting that claim to the jury. The order does not state the ultimate outcome of the claim at trial.