Johnson v. McMorrow

Background

Christopher Johnson sued New York State Troopers Andrew McMorrow and Marisa Rodriguez, along with unidentified John Doe defendants, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. He asserted claims for malicious prosecution, denial of a fair trial based on fabricated evidence, and failure to intervene. The claims arose from a traffic-stop arrest on February 9, 2018. The court had previously dismissed Johnson’s abuse-of-process and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims after Johnson withdrew them.

The troopers testified that they observed Johnson’s vehicle traveling well above the speed limit and committing other traffic violations. They said McMorrow detected an odor of alcohol, observed signs of intoxication, administered standardized field sobriety tests that Johnson failed, and arrested him after Johnson refused a preliminary breath test. Johnson gave a sharply different account: he said he was not speeding, was not asked about alcohol, did not perform sobriety tests, and was never asked to take a breath test.

Johnson was indicted on charges including aggravated unlicensed operation, driving while intoxicated, driving while impaired, and speeding. His first trial ended with a hung jury. At a second trial, he was convicted of speeding and acquitted of the other charges. The defendants then moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which permits judgment without a trial when there is no genuine dispute over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

Malicious-Prosecution Claims

For the federal malicious-prosecution claim, the court applied the elements of New York’s malicious-prosecution law, together with the requirement that the prosecution caused a post-arraignment restraint implicating the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that a grand-jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause. A plaintiff may rebut that presumption by presenting evidence that the indictment resulted from fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence, or other police misconduct undertaken in bad faith.

The court held that Johnson did not rebut the presumption. He presented no evidence about what occurred before the grand jury. His own version of the arrest was not enough, and the court found that passenger Rodington McLean’s testimony did not corroborate it and contradicted some of Johnson’s assertions. The court therefore dismissed Johnson’s federal malicious-prosecution claim and granted summary judgment on his state-law malicious-prosecution claim for the same reason.

Denial of a Fair Trial

A fair-trial claim based on fabricated evidence requires proof that an investigating official fabricated information likely to influence a jury, forwarded it to prosecutors, and thereby caused a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. The court noted that this type of claim can proceed even when probable cause existed for the arrest.

Johnson alleged that the troopers falsely reported that his breath smelled of alcohol, that he said he was coming from a party, that he showed signs of intoxication, that he swerved, and that he failed three field sobriety tests. The court held that Johnson offered no evidence of fabrication beyond his own testimony and the disagreement between his account and the troopers’ account. It found that McLean’s testimony did not support Johnson’s version. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the fabrication-of-evidence claim.

Failure to Intervene

The court explained that a law-enforcement officer may have a duty to intervene when another officer is violating a person’s constitutional rights in the officer’s presence. Because the court found that Johnson had not raised a genuine issue of material fact showing that any officer violated his constitutional rights, it also granted summary judgment on the failure-to-intervene claim.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Complaint. It did not decide the defendants’ qualified-immunity argument because the disposition made that unnecessary. The claims against the unidentified John Doe defendants were dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute because discovery had closed and the opinion stated that Johnson had not identified or served them. The Clerk was directed to close the case.