Flaherty v. Dixon

Background

Marie Flaherty sued Lindsey S. Dixon and unidentified defendants over events during Flaherty’s employment as a seasonal Amazon shopper. Flaherty alleged that workplace safety rules related to COVID-19 were not followed, that employees who raised concerns were harassed or retaliated against, and that Dixon circulated false statements accusing Flaherty of calling Whole Foods employees racist and making a statement about “colored people.” Flaherty brought claims for defamation, interference with her employment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Flaherty opposed Dixon’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint and sought permission to file a second amended complaint. The proposed amendment would add Amazon.com, Inc., Prime Now LLC, Whole Foods Markets Services, Inc., Jennifer Hutt, Davy Cumberland, and additional unidentified defendants. It would also add claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, New York Labor Law § 740, and claims for negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Rulings on the First Amended Complaint

The court found that the claims were timely. It concluded that New York’s COVID-19 executive orders extended the relevant limitations periods and that the claims were filed within those periods.

The court dismissed the defamation claim. It found that many statements were described too generally to provide enough information about who made them, when they were made, and to whom they were communicated. As to the statements that were adequately described, the court held that they were protected by a qualified common-interest privilege because they concerned alleged workplace misconduct and were communicated to managers, human-resources personnel, or employees with an interest in the subject. The complaint did not allege specific facts showing that Dixon knew the statements were false, recklessly disregarded their truth, or acted out of spite or ill will.

The court dismissed the tortious-interference claim. Flaherty did not adequately allege the terms of an employment contract or a specific breach. The court also explained that an at-will employment relationship is generally treated as a prospective relationship rather than an existing contract for this purpose. Even under that theory, the complaint did not adequately allege that Dixon was outside Flaherty’s employment relationship with Amazon, used wrongful means, or acted solely to harm Flaherty.

The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because a single allegedly false email accusing Flaherty of using racist language, even together with getting her fired, did not meet the required high standard for extreme and outrageous conduct. It dismissed the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because the complaint did not identify a duty of care that Dixon breached.

Proposed Second Amended Complaint

The court denied leave to add proposed defamation, intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress, New York Labor Law § 740, and Title VII claims against the new defendants. Those claims did not relate back to the original complaint and were time-barred. The court also found that Dixon could not be individually liable under Title VII or New York Labor Law § 740, making those proposed claims against Dixon futile.

The proposed tortious-interference claims were generally futile because the proposed complaint still did not adequately allege a contract, its material terms, wrongful means, a sole purpose to harm Flaherty, or facts showing that particular defendants caused the firing. The court allowed Flaherty to revise that claim if she could plead facts curing those deficiencies.

The proposed negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress, negligent-hiring, and negligent-supervision claims were futile. The proposed complaint did not identify a duty owed to Flaherty, and it did not allege that Amazon or Whole Foods knew or should have known that their employees had the harmful tendencies relevant to the claims.

The proposed race, gender, and disability discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and § 1981 were also futile. The court found no sufficient facts indicating that Flaherty was fired because of race, gender, or disability; was treated less favorably because of a protected characteristic; or was denied a reasonable disability accommodation. The allegations that coworkers treated Flaherty poorly, that most coworkers were of a different race, and that she wore extensive protective equipment did not sufficiently show discriminatory motive. The proposed § 1981 retaliation claim was futile because Flaherty’s complaints concerned alleged treatment by Whole Foods employees who were not her coworkers or supervisors and did not allege opposition to an unlawful employment practice covered by that statute.

The court reached a different conclusion for some proposed retaliation claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. It found that the proposed complaint plausibly alleged that Flaherty complained about perceived race discrimination by Whole Foods employees, that Dixon and Cumberland knew about those complaints, and that they participated in conduct leading to Flaherty’s firing. The court therefore found those claims not futile against Dixon and Cumberland. It also found the New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claim not futile against Amazon, Prime Now LLC, and Whole Foods because those entities could potentially be responsible for the acts of their managers or supervisors. The state-law retaliation claim was futile against the employer defendants because the proposed complaint did not allege a basis for treating them as having encouraged, approved, or condoned the conduct. The claims against the other defendants were futile because the proposed complaint did not adequately allege their involvement in retaliation.

The proposed implied-covenant claim was futile because the proposed complaint did not adequately allege the relevant contract or any implied duty that was breached. The court also explained that defendants who were not parties to the alleged contract could not be liable for breaching a duty implied in it, and that an at-will employment agreement could not include an implied promise not to fire Flaherty.

Disposition

The court granted Dixon’s motion to dismiss. It granted in part and denied in part Flaherty’s motion for leave to amend. By March 2, 2023, Flaherty could file a revised proposed complaint asserting New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claims against Dixon and Cumberland, and New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claims against Amazon, Prime Now LLC, and Whole Foods. She could also revise the tortious-interference claim if she could allege the required facts. The court did not grant leave to replead the other claims and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion and the case.