Brandenburg v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North America

Background

Elizabeth Brandenburg and Maria Kallis sued the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North America and several clergy members. They alleged that Father Gerasimos Makris subjected them to unwanted sexual attention and physical contact over several years while they were students, novices, and later sanctified nuns at All Saints Monastery. Their remaining claims were: hostile work environment under the New York State Human Rights Law; constructive discharge under that law, not based on a tangible employment action; retaliation under that law, not based on a tangible employment action; and defamation based on statements that they had stolen a Nissan Pathfinder.

Defendants moved for summary judgment under Rule 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to win as a matter of law. The court viewed disputed evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor for purposes of the motion.

The parties disputed the effect of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. That doctrine can bar some employment-discrimination claims brought by ministers against religious institutions. The plaintiffs conceded that they were ministers for purposes of the doctrine, and there was no dispute that the Archdiocese was a religious institution. The court had previously held that claims based on tangible employment actions, such as firing or changes in job assignments, were barred by the exception. The claims at issue here did not all involve such actions.

Hostile-Work-Environment Claims

The court denied summary judgment on the hostile-work-environment claims. It rejected defendants’ argument that the evidence did not show that the alleged conduct was because of sex. The plaintiffs described explicitly sexual touching, comments about their appearance, and gestures they understood as romantic or sexual. Father Makris also admitted that he had been inappropriately physical with two other women. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the conduct occurred because of the plaintiffs’ sex, and that male comparators were not required on these facts.

The court also rejected defendants’ statute-of-limitations argument. New York State Human Rights Law claims generally must be brought within three years, but a continuing course of discrimination can extend the relevant period when at least one related act occurred within the limitations period. The plaintiffs testified that the touching and other conduct continued through October 2017. Although a jury might reject that testimony, the testimony created a genuine factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

The court further held that the First Amendment did not require dismissal of these claims at the summary-judgment stage. It reasoned that a jury could decide whether the alleged conduct occurred, whether it continued into the limitations period, and whether it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive work environment without deciding the truth or validity of religious doctrine. Because defendants offered a religious explanation for at most one relatively minor aspect of the alleged conduct—the kissing—the plaintiffs could not present a competing interpretation of Greek Orthodox teachings or canon law. They could, however, argue that the stated religious explanation was not the actual reason for the conduct.

Constructive-Discharge Claims

The court held that the constructive-discharge claims failed as a matter of law. Constructive discharge occurs when working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign. The plaintiffs alleged no misconduct by Father Makris after October 2017, and they did not resign until November 2018—more than a year later. The court found that this gap was fatal to the claims. It did not reach defendants’ additional arguments based on the ministerial exception or church-autonomy doctrine.

Defamation Claims

The court granted summary judgment on the defamation claims. Under New York law, a plaintiff must show that the challenged statement was false, among other elements. The plaintiffs had not produced admissible evidence from which a jury could find that Mother Eisodia’s statements that they stole the vehicle were false.

The record showed that the monastery was the vehicle’s registered owner and insurance policyholder, and Kallis acknowledged that the title had not been switched when the plaintiffs took the vehicle. The plaintiffs’ account of what police officers allegedly told them was hearsay and could not defeat summary judgment. Their assertion that they had paid for the vehicle also did not establish who legally owned it when they took it.

Retaliation Claims

The court allowed the retaliation claims to proceed only in part. The plaintiffs alleged retaliation based partly on being barred from certain churches, being prevented from interacting with churchgoers, and being prevented from selling soaps. The court held that selling soap was a side hobby and that preventing it was not an adverse employment action. Claims based on barring the plaintiffs from churches and parishioners were barred by the ministerial exception because those allegations directly concerned the removal of ministerial duties and spiritual functions.

The court allowed the retaliation claims based on an unfulfilled threat to send the plaintiffs to Greece to proceed. An unfulfilled threat is not a tangible employment action, so the court analyzed it under the same framework as the hostile-work-environment claims. The court concluded that a jury could decide, using neutral legal principles, whether the alleged threat was retaliation for reporting sexual harassment without resolving questions of religious doctrine. If defendants present a religious explanation at trial, the jury may consider whether that explanation was the actual reason for the threat, but may not decide whether the religious rationale was wise, reasonable, valid, or true.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It dismissed the constructive-discharge and defamation claims and dismissed the retaliation claims in part. The hostile-work-environment claims and the retaliation claims based on the unfulfilled threat to send the plaintiffs to Greece survived. The court directed that the plaintiffs and jury could not challenge or evaluate the validity or plausibility of religious teachings or doctrines. The court emphasized that its First Amendment ruling was based on the current record and could be revisited if the trial record materially differed.