Ataroua v. Tamir

Background

Islam Ataroua, who was incarcerated and represented himself, filed an amended complaint after the court dismissed his original complaint for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The amended complaint concerned a 2016 altercation while Ataroua was a pretrial detainee at the Anna M. Kross Center. He alleged that a correctional employee, identified as Jane Doe #1, was absent from her post and failed to protect him from other incarcerated people. He also alleged that the City of New York and supervisory officials failed to train or supervise employees; that former Comptroller Scott Stringer and Claims Examiner Richard Briskin retaliated against him by directing him to contact his former lawyer about a Freedom of Information Law request; and that Zaki Isaac B. Tamir and the Tamir Law Group, PC, misled him and caused him to miss the limitations period for a personal-injury claim.

Federal civil-rights claims

The court screened the complaint under the federal prisoner-screening statutes. For the failure-to-protect claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court held that Ataroua did not plead facts showing an objectively serious risk of harm or that Jane Doe #1 acted with deliberate indifference. The court also concluded that the claim appeared time-barred because the injury occurred in 2016, New York’s limitations period for this type of claim is three years, and the complaint did not establish a basis for extending that period. The court therefore dismissed the Section 1983 claim against Jane Doe #1 for failure to state a claim and as time-barred.

The court rejected the Section 1983 claim against the City because Ataroua did not adequately allege a city policy, custom, or practice that caused a constitutional violation. The court also dismissed the claims against former Mayor Bill de Blasio, former DOC Commissioner Joseph Ponte, AMKC Warden Carlton Newton, and Supervising Warden Robert Cripps because the complaint did not show their direct personal involvement and could not impose liability merely because they supervised others. Those claims also had the same timeliness problems.

The court held that the allegations against Stringer and Briskin did not state a First Amendment retaliation claim because Ataroua did not identify a protected interest or facts showing that their conduct was motivated by his exercise of a First Amendment right. The court also dismissed the federal claims against Tamir and the Tamir Law Group because they were private parties, and the complaint did not allege the government involvement required for Section 1983 liability.

State-law claims and disposition

The complaint could be understood to assert state-law negligence claims against Jane Doe #1 and legal-malpractice or other state-law claims against Tamir and the Tamir Law Group. It was unclear whether Ataroua also asserted state-law claims against Briskin and Stringer. After dismissing all claims within its original federal jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear related state-law claims—and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.

The court dismissed Ataroua’s Section 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). It dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice, certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, denied fee-free status for an appeal, and directed entry of judgment.