Herbin v. The City of New York

Background

Reginald Herbin, who was incarcerated at Rikers Island when the order was issued, filed the action without a lawyer and was allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees. He alleged that the New York City Housing Authority and others deprived him of personal property. The defendants named in the complaint were the City of New York; “NYCHA Public Housing Preservation LLC managed by New York City Housing Authority − Drew Hamilton Houses”; Assistant Managers Adrianne Murray, Ciata Diggs, and Kisha Edwards; Baya Interstate Transport Moving & Storage, Inc.; and John and Jane Doe defendants employed by Baya.

According to the complaint, Herbin and the Housing Authority were involved in civil-contempt proceedings in New York City Housing Court. They agreed to a stipulation that would allow Herbin to retrieve his property from a Housing Authority property for safekeeping. Herbin alleged that the Housing Authority instead transferred the property to Baya, which sold it at auction. He also alleged that the Housing Court directed the Housing Authority to pay him $250, but that the Housing Authority refused to do so. He asserted claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendments and sought damages.

Legal standards

Because Herbin was proceeding without prepaying fees, the court was required to screen his complaint. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court had to dismiss claims that were frivolous or malicious, failed to state a claim for relief, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also had to dismiss claims outside its subject-matter jurisdiction.

The court explained that it must read a complaint filed by a person without a lawyer generously, but the complaint still must provide enough facts to make a legally recognized claim plausible. Legal conclusions without supporting facts are not enough.

Federal civil-rights claims against Baya

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a person acting under state law deprives someone of a right protected by the Constitution or federal law. Private parties generally are not subject to Section 1983 unless their conduct can legally be treated as state action. The court identified three circumstances in which private conduct may qualify: government coercion or control, joint activity with the government, or performance of a function delegated by the government.

The court held that Herbin did not allege facts showing that Baya, the private company that sold his property, acted as a state actor. It therefore dismissed the Section 1983 claims against Baya and its employees for failure to state a claim.

Federal civil-rights claims against the government defendants

The City, the Housing Authority, and the individual Housing Authority employees were treated as state actors for purposes of Section 1983. However, the court held that a federal claim for deprivation of personal property is unavailable when state courts provide an adequate remedy for the loss.

The court found that Herbin had not shown that available state remedies were inadequate or inappropriate. It therefore dismissed his property-loss claim against the City, the Housing Authority, Adrianne Murray, Ciata Diggs, and Kisha Edwards for failure to state a claim.

State-law claims and amendment

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning its authority to hear related state-law claims, over any state-law tort claims Herbin might be asserting.

The court also denied leave to amend. Although courts generally give a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to correct a defective complaint, the court concluded that the defects here could not be cured by amendment.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). It declined to consider any state-law claims under supplemental jurisdiction, terminated all other pending matters, and directed the clerk to enter judgment. The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Herbin permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal.