Conklin v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Background

Patrick Conklin sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Alejandro Mayorkas under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He alleged disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, retaliation, and a hostile work environment based on events during his ICE employment from 2015 through 2020. Conklin described his condition as a mood disorder connected with bipolar disorder and anxiousness.

Conklin alleged that supervisors criticized his work, assigned him a large workload, mocked or mistreated him, restricted his bathroom use, placed him on limited duty at a reception desk, and eventually participated in actions leading to his termination. He also alleged that he complained about discrimination and harassment and was retaliated against for those complaints. The defendants disputed important parts of Conklin’s account and argued that their employment decisions were based on reported concerns about his conduct and fitness for duty.

Excluded Declarations

The defendants asked the court to preclude, or bar the use of, declarations from Reno Mayoral, Mark Raymond, and Michael Taback because Conklin had not disclosed those people as potential witnesses as required by the federal discovery rules. The court granted that application. It found that Conklin offered no explanation for the nondisclosure, did not rely on the declarations in his opposition, and that considering them would prejudice the defendants because they had not been able to depose the witnesses or address their statements during summary-judgment briefing. The court therefore did not consider those three declarations. The opinion’s discussion also identifies a declaration from Steven Middleton, but the court’s exclusion ruling specifically names only the Mayoral, Raymond, and Taback declarations.

Disability Discrimination

The court granted summary judgment for the defendants on Conklin’s intentional disability-discrimination claim. The court assumed for purposes of the analysis that ICE was covered by the Rehabilitation Act and that Conklin was a person with a disability. It nevertheless concluded that no reasonable jury could find that the challenged actions were unlawfully motivated by disability discrimination.

The court found that Conklin had not provided enough nonconclusory evidence that his workload was disproportionately heavier than other officers’ workloads. His placement on limited duty and at the reception desk could qualify as an adverse employment action because it significantly reduced his job responsibilities, but the defendants gave legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for that decision: reports from multiple sources raised concerns about his conduct, fitness to perform deportation-officer duties, weapon access, and access to sensitive information. The court found that Conklin did not provide enough evidence that those reasons were a pretext for disability discrimination.

The court also concluded that Conklin’s bathroom restrictions, negative performance reviews, reprimands, verbal abuse, alleged book-throwing, and increased scrutiny did not establish a qualifying adverse employment action for his discrimination claim. It further held that the investigation and termination, although adverse employment actions, were supported by legitimate reasons that Conklin did not show were pretextual.

Failure to Accommodate

The court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the failure-to-accommodate claim. It found that the 2016 shift-change request was granted; the 2016 and early 2017 requests for transfer to the Newburgh Office were not shown to be related to Conklin’s disability; and the requests to be reassigned away from Harrington were effectively granted when Conklin was moved to different supervisors and units.

The court also held that changing an employee’s supervisor is generally not a reasonable accommodation, and that an employer need not provide the employee’s preferred accommodation if an effective accommodation is provided. Conklin did not show that his 2018 transfer requests were connected to his disability or overcome the defendants’ evidence that he was ineligible for transfer while on administrative duty. His request to change his reception-desk seating was not shown to be a disability-related accommodation request.

Retaliation

The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part as to retaliation. Under the Rehabilitation Act, protected activity includes complaining about disability discrimination or requesting an accommodation. The court found that a jury could treat several of Conklin’s complaints and his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filings as protected activity, but it rejected most of the alleged retaliatory actions because the evidence did not show a qualifying adverse action, the required knowledge, or a causal connection.

The retaliation claim based on the alleged August 2, 2017 call from Franz Jeudy survived summary judgment. Conklin said that after he reported Harrington’s conduct outside his chain of command, Jeudy threatened that he had to report for discipline and said he had no business reporting the incidents outside the chain of command. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that the threat would deter a worker from making a discrimination complaint and that its timing and wording supported causation. The defendants did not address this allegation in their reply, so the court denied summary judgment on this aspect of the retaliation claim.

The court granted summary judgment on the other retaliation theories, including claims involving the April and November 2017 performance reviews, the September 2017 placement on limited duty and reception-desk assignment, the August 14 meeting, the newspaper and computer-screen incidents, the denied transfers, and the 2019 reassignment. The court found variously that the alleged protected activity occurred after the challenged action, that the conduct was not materially adverse, that the responsible decisionmaker’s knowledge was not shown, that legitimate reasons were unrebutted, or that the alleged causal connection was too unclear or unsupported.

Hostile Work Environment

The court denied summary judgment on the hostile-work-environment claim. Conklin alleged that Harrington repeatedly yelled at him, mocked his disability, stared or stood over him, threw a book, and engaged in other threatening or humiliating conduct. ICE’s internal investigation found that Harrington used rude, unprofessional, or similarly inappropriate language or conduct near Conklin, although it found the hostile-work-environment charge unsubstantiated because the evidence did not connect the conduct to a protected class.

The court held that, if Conklin’s account were credited and the conduct was connected to his disability, a reasonable jury could find that it created an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. The court also found a factual dispute about whether Harrington knew about Conklin’s disability. The hostile-work-environment claim therefore remained for further proceedings.

Disposition

The court granted summary judgment on the disability-discrimination and failure-to-accommodate causes of action. It denied summary judgment on the hostile-work-environment cause of action. It granted in part and denied in part summary judgment on the retaliation cause of action, denying it only as to the alleged August 2, 2017 call from Jeudy and granting it as to the other retaliation theories. The court also granted the application to preclude the Mayoral, Raymond, and Taback declarations. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Cott for general pretrial management and possible settlement proceedings.