Zappin v. Schorr

Background

Anthony Zappin, a disbarred attorney representing himself, sued Matthew F. Cooper, Kevin M. Doyle, and David Evan Schorr. Cooper was the state-court judge who presided over substantial portions of Zappin’s divorce proceedings. Doyle prosecuted disciplinary charges against Zappin through the Attorney Grievance Committee. Schorr, a private-practice attorney, represented Zappin during part of the divorce proceedings.

The amended complaint asserted six claims: two civil racketeering claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; a New York fraud claim against Schorr; a state-law claim for interference with parental rights against Doyle and Schorr; a state-law abuse-of-process claim against Cooper and Doyle; and an abuse-of-process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cooper and Doyle. Zappin alleged that the defendants participated in a scheme to undermine his position in the divorce proceedings and engineer his criminal prosecution and disbarment.

Motions and legal standards

Cooper and Doyle moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. Schorr moved under Rule 12(b)(5), which concerns inadequate service of process, and also moved to seal a financial decision from his matrimonial action.

The court explained that a complaint must contain enough factual allegations to make liability plausible. It also noted that, although courts generally give special consideration to people representing themselves, Zappin was a former attorney and was not entitled to that additional consideration. For sealing, the court balanced the public’s presumptive right to access court documents against countervailing interests, including privacy.

Rulings on the state defendants’ motion

The court granted Cooper and Doyle’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.

The court dismissed Counts I and II, the civil racketeering claims, as untimely. It applied a four-year limitations period and concluded that Zappin knew of the alleged misconduct in 2015 and 2016, more than four years before he filed this action on March 11, 2022. The court also stated that those claims independently failed to state a claim because the alleged mail- and wire-fraud conduct did not sufficiently allege a scheme to obtain money or property.

The court dismissed with prejudice the claim for tortious interference with parental rights. It held that New York does not recognize the cause of action asserted by Zappin and that the cases he cited involved interference with child custody, not the broader claim he pleaded.

The court dismissed Counts IV and V, the state-law and federal abuse-of-process claims, with prejudice. It found that Zappin did not plausibly allege that Cooper and Doyle sought a filing injunction with an improper intent or illegitimate objective. The court also held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a basis for a claim alleging abuse of civil process.

Rulings on Schorr’s motions

The court declined to grant Schorr’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service. Although Schorr challenged the circumstances of service, the record showed that his doorman received the case documents and that the documents were also mailed. The court concluded that it could not dismiss the claims against Schorr on the ground that there was no reasonably conceivable way to establish personal jurisdiction over him.

The court nevertheless dismissed with prejudice the remaining claim against Schorr, Count III, the state-law fraud claim, under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that the allegations were contradicted by the record and by the outcomes of earlier proceedings concerning Zappin’s divorce, custody dispute, disciplinary proceedings, and disbarment. It characterized the fraud claim as frivolous and found no substantial question about whether Zappin could prevail. The court also noted that the fraud allegations were untimely under New York’s limitations periods.

The court granted Schorr’s motion to seal the financial decision from his matrimonial action. It found that the privacy interests of Schorr and his family outweighed the presumption of public access. The court stated that those privacy interests were protected by New York domestic-relations law and court rules. The ruling barred public access to the document on this case’s docket but, as described in the opinion, did not seek to prevent Zappin from accessing or using it altogether.

Disposition

The court granted the state defendants’ motion to dismiss, granted Schorr’s motion to seal, and dismissed Count III against Schorr for failure to state a claim. The court closed the case. It also reminded Zappin that an existing injunction barred him from filing, without court permission, new actions in the Southern District of New York against Cooper, New York State, New York State entities or agencies, or current or former New York State judges, officials, or employees when the actions arose from the specified divorce, disciplinary, arrest, prosecution, or related events.