Leslie v. City of New York

Background

Shakira Leslie and Shamil Burgos brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York and several New York Police Department and medical-examiner officials in their official capacities. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief based on alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and New York Executive Law Article 49-B.

The complaint alleged that NYPD officers secretly collected DNA from items used by people suspected of crimes, including cigarettes, chewing gum, beverage containers, and other partially consumed items. The NYPD allegedly analyzed the samples, created DNA profiles, placed those profiles in a local database called the Suspect Index, and continuously compared them with DNA from crime scenes. The complaint alleged that profiles could remain in the database for years, including after criminal charges were dismissed.

Leslie alleged that the NYPD collected her DNA from a cup after her arrest and questioning, even though officers found no contraband on her. She was not indicted, and the charges against her were dismissed, but her DNA profile allegedly remained in the Suspect Index. Burgos similarly alleged that the NYPD collected his DNA from a cigarette and water after his arrest. He was never indicted, his charges were dismissed, and his DNA profile also allegedly remained in the database.

The NYPD announced policy reforms in February 2020, including periodic reviews of profiles and a process through which some people could seek removal. After the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, the NYPD conducted an expedited review and removed both plaintiffs’ profiles from the Suspect Index on May 19, 2022. Burgos’s earlier request for removal had been denied without explanation.

Rule 12(b)(1) motion and standing

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which allows dismissal when a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. They argued that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and that the later removal of their DNA profiles made the case moot.

The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly established all three standing requirements. First, they alleged an injury in fact because their DNA had been collected and analyzed without their knowledge, consent, a warrant, or a court order; maintained in a government database; and compared with crime-scene evidence for years. Second, the alleged injury was traceable to the defendants’ creation and operation of the Suspect Index. The court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs’ profiles would inevitably have been removed under the NYPD’s policies, noting that Burgos had requested removal and had been denied, and that both profiles remained in the database for nearly three years.

Third, the court found that the alleged injury was redressable when the complaint was filed. The plaintiffs’ DNA profiles were still in the Suspect Index and allegedly being compared with crime-scene evidence at that time. The court explained that standing is assessed when a lawsuit begins; whether later events eliminate the continuing need for relief concerns mootness instead.

Mootness

The court held that the later removal of the plaintiffs’ DNA profiles did not make the case moot. It applied two exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

Under the inherently transitory exception, a claim may continue in a putative class action when an individual’s claim is likely to end before the court can decide class certification, while a continuing group of people remains subject to the challenged practice. The court found a significant possibility that future plaintiffs’ DNA profiles could also be removed before class certification because the NYPD’s review process was discretionary and the defendants had expedited removal of Leslie’s and Burgos’s profiles shortly after the lawsuit began. The court also found that there would continue to be a group of people whose DNA was placed in the Suspect Index and compared with crime-scene DNA.

The court separately applied the voluntary-cessation exception. A defendant’s voluntary decision to stop challenged conduct does not make a case moot unless the defendant shows that the alleged violation will not reasonably recur and that its effects have been completely and permanently eliminated. The court found that the challenged DNA practices continued for the putative class, that there was no indication the defendants planned to discontinue the Suspect Index, and that the timing of the expedited removals raised concerns about an attempt to prevent class litigation. The defendants therefore had not met the demanding burden required to establish mootness.

Pullman abstention

The court also considered, after requesting supplemental briefing, whether to abstain under the Pullman doctrine. That doctrine permits a federal court to delay or decline to decide a federal constitutional issue when an unclear state-law question could eliminate or change the need for the constitutional ruling.

The court concluded that abstention was not warranted. It found that Article 49-B was not unclear because it did not expressly authorize local DNA indexes, and the court was competent to address whether the absence of authorization permitted such indexes. The Fourth Amendment claims did not depend on resolving the state-law claim first because the constitutional issues could be analyzed independently. The court also concluded that no interpretation of Article 49-B would eliminate the need to decide whether collecting and analyzing the plaintiffs’ DNA violated the Fourth Amendment.

Supplemental jurisdiction and disposition

The defendants separately argued that the court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over the Article 49-B claim because it was not closely related to the Fourth Amendment claim and raised a novel or complex state-law issue. Supplemental jurisdiction is a federal court’s authority to hear related state-law claims alongside federal claims. The court reserved decision on that argument, explaining that the Fourth Amendment claims could affect the scope of the state-law claim and that the issue could remain open during the litigation.

Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The order resolved the jurisdictional, mootness, and abstention issues addressed in the opinion, but it did not decide whether the NYPD’s DNA practices violated the Fourth Amendment or New York Executive Law Article 49-B.