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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Mar. 30, 2023

Corrales v. Montefiore Medical Center

Judge
Loretta Preska
Docket
1:22-cv-03219
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
24
EmploymentMotion to DismissCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Corrales v. Montefiore Medical Center, Judge Preska granted Montefiore’s dismissal motion without prejudice because the requested vaccine exemption would violate state law.

Who this affects

Alba L. Corrales and Montefiore Medical Center; Corrales’s Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law claims were dismissed without prejudice.

What happened

Alba L. Corrales sued her former employer, Montefiore Medical Center, under federal, New York State, and New York City laws. She alleged that Montefiore failed to accommodate her religious objection to COVID-19 vaccination, placed her on unpaid leave, and terminated her employment after denying her exemption request.

Montefiore argued that granting Corrales’s requested exemption would violate New York’s health rule requiring covered healthcare entities to ensure that covered personnel are vaccinated. Corrales sought to continue her regular job while unvaccinated, rather than an alternative arrangement that would remove her from the rule’s coverage.

Judge Loretta A. Preska granted Montefiore’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court ruled that the requested blanket exemption would have caused undue hardship because it would have required Montefiore to violate state law, but allowed Corrales to seek permission to file a new pleading.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Corrales v. Montefiore Medical Center · No. 1:22-cv-03219
Judge
Loretta Preska
Date
Mar. 30, 2023

Background

Alba L. Corrales sued Montefiore Medical Center, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, New York State Executive Law, and the New York City Administrative Code. Corrales alleged that she had a sincerely held religious objection to COVID-19 vaccination, that Montefiore denied her request for a religious exemption, and that Montefiore then placed her on unpaid leave and terminated her employment after she continued to refuse vaccination.

Montefiore required its employees to comply with the New York State Department of Health’s COVID-19 vaccination rule, known as Section 2.61. That rule required covered entities to ensure that covered personnel were fully vaccinated, although it provided medical exemptions and did not provide religious exemptions. Montefiore nevertheless created a process for employees to request religious exemptions. Corrales submitted such a request, supporting statements, and additional information, but Montefiore denied it.

Motion to dismiss

Montefiore moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. Montefiore argued that it was required to comply with Section 2.61 and that accommodating Corrales’s request would cause undue hardship because it would require Montefiore to violate state law and would expose staff and visitors to COVID-19 risks.

The court rejected Montefiore’s argument that the new allegations in the amended complaint should be disregarded. Because those allegations appeared on the face of the amended complaint, the court considered them. The court also explained that an amended complaint replaces the original complaint, while declining to treat the contents of external documents as true when those documents were not attached to or incorporated into the complaint.

Court’s analysis

The court held that Corrales alleged enough facts to make a preliminary case for religious discrimination under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law. She alleged a genuine religious belief conflicting with vaccination, notice to Montefiore of that belief, and discipline for refusing to comply with the vaccination requirement. The court applied the same basic framework to the New York City Human Rights Law, while recognizing that the city law must be analyzed separately and is broader than federal and state law in some respects.

The court then addressed whether Montefiore could provide the requested accommodation without undue hardship. Corrales sought a blanket exemption that would have allowed her to remain in her regular employment while unvaccinated. The court determined that she did not seek an alternative accommodation, such as telework, that would have removed her from the scope of Section 2.61.

Relying on Second Circuit precedent, the court ruled that Section 2.61 barred a blanket religious exemption allowing covered personnel to continue working in their current positions while unvaccinated. Granting Corrales’s requested exemption would therefore have required Montefiore to violate binding state law and would have caused undue hardship under the applicable statutes.

Disposition

The court dismissed Corrales’s Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law claims without prejudice. It also dismissed her New York City Human Rights Law claim without prejudice. The court granted Montefiore’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and stated that Corrales could move to file a new pleading with a proposed amended complaint. The Clerk was directed to close the case and any open motions.

The authoritative version

Read the full 24-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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