Doe v. City of New York
- Loretta Preska
- 1:22-cv-06898
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 12
In Doe v. City of New York, Judge Preska granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss the retaliation claims.
Jane Doe’s retaliation claims against the City of New York and the New York City Department of Corrections. All claims against the Department of Corrections were dismissed; the retaliation allegations concerning the extended shift and lack of backup were allowed to proceed, while the transfer-based retaliation theory was not.
What happened
In Doe v. City of New York, Jane Doe alleged that New York City and its Department of Corrections retaliated against her for filing an earlier lawsuit about sexual harassment and assault. She claimed that the defendants transferred her, required her to work an extended shift without a meal break, and refused to provide backup when inmates threatened her.
The court dismissed all claims against the Department of Corrections because it is not a separate suable agency under New York law. The court also rejected the retaliation theory based on the transfer, finding that the transfer occurred about three years after the earlier lawsuit and that the complaint lacked additional facts connecting the transfer to retaliation. The court allowed the retaliation allegations based on the extended shift and refusal to provide backup to proceed because the timing and circumstances plausibly supported retaliation, and leaving Doe alone with threatening inmates could discourage a reasonable employee from reporting discrimination.
Judge Preska therefore granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The opinion did not resolve whether Doe will ultimately prove retaliation; it decided only which allegations could proceed beyond the pleading stage.
The detailed version
- Doe v. City of New York · No. 1:22-cv-06898
- Loretta Preska
- July 19, 2023
Background
Jane Doe sued the City of New York and the New York City Department of Corrections, alleging retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleged that she was retaliated against for filing an earlier lawsuit alleging sexual harassment and assault by a deputy warden and a corrections officer. That earlier lawsuit was resolved through a settlement.
Doe alleged that the defendants later transferred her to the Otis Bantum Correctional Center, where the two employees worked for several years and where their friends and associates remained employed. She claimed that, after the transfer, she was required to remain at her post for a triple tour without a meal break and was left without backup while forty-four inmates became angry and threatened her.
Rule 12(b)(6) standard
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepts non-conclusory factual allegations as true and asks whether they plausibly support liability. The court generally does not consider materials outside the pleadings.
For the retaliation claims, the court explained that Doe had to plausibly allege that the defendants took an adverse action because she opposed unlawful employment conduct. For Title VII and New York State law, the alleged retaliation had to be a materially adverse action and had to be caused by the protected activity. Under the New York City Human Rights Law, the alleged conduct needed to be caused at least in part by retaliatory motives, and the law covers retaliation in any manner.
Claims against the Department of Corrections
The court agreed with the defendants that the Department of Corrections is a non-suable agency of the City under New York law. It therefore dismissed all claims against the Department of Corrections.
Retaliation allegations based on the transfer
The court held that Doe did not adequately plead causation for the retaliation theory based on her transfer to the correctional facility. The transfer occurred about three years after she filed the earlier lawsuit. The court found that this gap was too long, standing alone, to support an inference that retaliation was the necessary cause of the transfer, and the complaint did not include additional allegations that plausibly connected the transfer to retaliatory intent.
Retaliation allegations based on the extended shift and lack of backup
The court reached a different conclusion concerning the alleged triple tour and refusal to provide backup. Although the earlier lawsuit had been filed about three years before those events, the court considered the context: Doe alleged that the defendants’ employees had no opportunity to retaliate against her until she was transferred to the facility where the earlier employees’ friends and colleagues worked. The alleged retaliatory conduct occurred roughly two months after that transfer, which was enough at the pleading stage to support an inference of causation.
The court did not decide whether the triple tour alone was materially adverse. It rejected the defendants’ reliance on material outside the complaint to argue that triple tours were common. Independently, however, the court held that Doe plausibly alleged a materially adverse action by claiming that she was left alone with forty-four angry inmates and denied backup. Accepting those allegations as true, the risk of serious physical harm or death could discourage a reasonable employee from making or supporting a discrimination complaint.
Disposition
Judge Preska granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The order dismissed all claims against the Department of Corrections and rejected the retaliation theory based on the transfer, while allowing the retaliation allegations based on the triple tour and refusal to provide backup to proceed. The court directed counsel to confer and report how they proposed to proceed.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.