Severin v. New York City Department Of Education

Background

Jean Richard Severin worked as a social studies teacher at Urban Action Academy High School from September 2014 to May 2016. The defendants were the New York City Department of Education, former Principal Steven Dorcely, former Assistant Principal Jordan Barnett, and former Superintendent Michael Prayor.

Severin alleged that Dorcely attempted to have a student change answers on a Regents examination in August 2014. In April 2015, after discussing the incident with his union representative, Severin reported it to New York City’s Special Commissioner of Investigation, or SCI. The SCI referred the complaint to the Department of Education’s internal investigative unit, which later concluded that the complaint could not be substantiated.

Beginning around the same time, Dorcely cited Severin for various alleged misconduct, including lateness, failing to report absences, failing to submit grades, and failing to submit lesson plans. Severin also presented evidence that Dorcely threatened him, shoved him, photographed him without permission, and continued documenting alleged misconduct. The Department of Education later brought formal disciplinary charges against Severin. In two disciplinary proceedings, hearing officers found him responsible for numerous violations, and the second hearing officer concluded that termination was appropriate. That penalty was later upheld in a state-court proceeding.

Severin’s federal complaint originally asserted a First Amendment retaliation claim and a claim under New York Civil Service Law § 75-b. The court previously dismissed the state-law claim as untimely but allowed the First Amendment claim to proceed. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party.

The First Amendment claim

The court held that Severin did not engage in speech protected by the First Amendment. A public employee generally receives First Amendment protection only when speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern. The court explained that speech made as part of an employee’s official duties is not protected, even if the subject could interest the public.

The court concluded that Severin reported the alleged exam misconduct as part of his responsibilities as a public-school teacher. The report concerned conduct related to a student’s standardized test, was based on knowledge Severin gained through his employment, and involved his ability to perform his work. The court also relied on Severin’s testimony that he reported the matter after his union representative told him that he had to report it. Although the SCI was an independent agency and the report could have involved a matter of public concern, those facts did not change the court’s conclusion that Severin spoke as an employee rather than as a citizen.

Because the report was not protected speech, the court held that Severin could not establish a First Amendment retaliation claim as a matter of law.

Alternative ground

The court separately held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment under the rule commonly associated with Mount Healthy. Under that rule, an employer is not liable for retaliation if it proves that it would have taken the same adverse action even without the allegedly protected speech.

The court found that the evidence established that Severin would have been terminated because of his repeated misconduct, regardless of any hostility Dorcely may have had toward him. The court relied on the findings from the two disciplinary hearings, including findings that Severin failed to attend mandatory meetings, failed to submit required materials and grades, failed to report absences, made disparaging comments, slept during class, and allowed students to watch inappropriate content and listen to vulgar lyrics. Severin did not present evidence creating a genuine dispute about those findings.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It ruled for the defendants both because Severin’s report was not protected speech and, alternatively, because he would have been terminated for his misconduct anyway. The court did not reach the defendants’ arguments that Prayor and Barnett lacked personal involvement or were protected by qualified immunity. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion and close the case.