Tanner v. MTA Long Island Railroad

Background

By an earlier order and judgment, the court dismissed Walter Tanner’s action. The court dismissed his federal-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally prevents a federal district court from reviewing a state-court judgment. The court declined to consider Tanner’s state-law claims under its supplemental jurisdiction.

Tanner later filed a letter stating that the earlier order had been sent without the referenced appeal package. He asked the court to vacate the dismissal, challenged the decision based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and asked the court to issue a summons and complaint to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The court liberally construed the letter as both a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b).

Rule 59(e) motion

A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within 28 days after judgment and must show that the court overlooked controlling law or factual matters previously presented. Tanner filed his letter 21 days after judgment was entered, so the motion was timely. The court concluded, however, that Tanner had not shown that the court overlooked any controlling legal authority or factual matter. The court therefore denied Tanner’s Rule 59(e) motion.

Rule 60(b) motion

Rule 60(b) permits relief from a final order or judgment for specified reasons, including mistake, newly discovered evidence, misconduct by an opposing party, a void judgment, satisfaction or reversal of the judgment, or another reason justifying relief. The court concluded that, even under a liberal reading of Tanner’s arguments, he had not shown that any of the first five grounds applied. The court therefore denied the Rule 60(b) motion to the extent it relied on those grounds.

The court also denied relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the provision covering other reasons that might justify relief. That provision requires extraordinary circumstances, and the court found that Tanner had merely disagreed with the reasons for the dismissal rather than shown extraordinary circumstances.

Disposition

The court denied Tanner’s Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions. The action remained closed. The court directed the clerk to accept only documents directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this action. It also warned that filing additional frivolous or meritless documents could lead to an order requiring Tanner to explain why he should not be barred from filing further documents in the action.

The court certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore denied fee-free appeal status.