Medlin v. Tedford

Background

George Medlin sought federal review of his New York convictions on three counts of first-degree rape and six counts of first-degree criminal sexual act. He raised two claims under the Sixth Amendment, which provides a criminal defendant with the right to effective assistance from a lawyer.

Medlin argued that his trial lawyer, Robert Johnston, was ineffective because he did not consult with or call a medical expert to challenge the prosecution’s evidence about the child’s injury. He also argued that counsel should have called an expert to rebut Dr. Don Lewittes’s testimony about Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome and delayed reporting by child-abuse victims.

The New York trial court rejected Medlin’s ineffective-assistance claims. The Appellate Division, First Department unanimously affirmed, concluding that Medlin had not shown either that counsel’s actions were objectively unreasonable or that they caused prejudice. The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Magistrate Judge Stewart D. Aaron later recommended denying Medlin’s federal petition, and Medlin objected to that recommendation.

Legal standard

The court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington. A petitioner must show both that the lawyer’s performance fell below reasonable professional standards and that the performance prejudiced the defense, meaning there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different without the lawyer’s errors.

Because the state courts had decided Medlin’s claims on the merits, the court also applied the deferential review required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Under that standard, federal relief was available only if the state-court decision unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law or rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Court’s analysis

The court held that the state courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland. Johnston pursued a consistent defense theory that Medlin lacked the opportunity to commit the alleged acts and that common-sense evaluation of the evidence undermined the prosecution’s case. Johnston cross-examined the child, her mother, and the prosecution’s experts about the timing of the allegations, other possible visitors to the apartment, the lack of scarring, the small size of the injury, and the limits of the experts’ testimony.

The court treated that approach as a reasonable trial strategy rather than constitutionally deficient performance. It distinguished a prior Second Circuit case in which counsel had essentially accepted the prosecution’s medical evidence without investigating or challenging it. Here, by contrast, Johnston repeatedly questioned whether the medical evidence showed sexual penetration. The court also noted that there was no categorical rule requiring defense lawyers to consult or call experts in child-sexual-abuse cases.

The court separately held that Medlin had not shown prejudice. The proposed medical testimony identified possible alternative causes of the injury, but the medical expert Medlin relied on in the state proceeding also acknowledged that the injury could have resulted from the alleged abuse and that abuse does not always cause substantial physical injury. The court therefore found no reasonable probability that presenting that expert would have changed the verdict.

The court also found no prejudice from counsel’s failure to call an expert regarding Dr. Lewittes’s testimony. Medlin did not present an affidavit or testimony from a psychological expert explaining how that testimony could have been rebutted. The court further noted that Johnston had cross-examined Lewittes and established that Lewittes had not evaluated the child or formed an opinion about whether she had been abused.

Disposition

Judge Ramos adopted Judge Aaron’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety and denied Medlin’s petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the case. The court also stated that a certificate of appealability would not issue because Medlin had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied.