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S.D.N.Y.MixedFiled May 17, 2023

K.S. v. City of New York

Judge
Jed Rakoff
Docket
1:21-cv-04649
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
5
ADA / DisabilityPreliminary InjunctionCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In K.S. v. City of New York, Judge Crotty granted in part and denied in part a request for emergency educational-placement funding.

Who this affects

K.S. and D.S., who sought residential educational placement and funding from the New York City Department of Education; the DOE and other City defendants were affected by the requested and ordered relief.

What happened

K.S. sued New York City and other defendants over educational and related services for her minor child, D.S., a student with disabilities. D.S.’s education plans called for residential educational placement, and the Department of Education had previously funded residential facilities.

After D.S. left one facility, K.S. sought funding for another placement. The parties agreed that D.S. could be placed at Family First Adolescent Services at least temporarily, but they disagreed about how long and how extensively the Department of Education had to pay.

The court granted in part and denied in part K.S.’s request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. It declined to decide some disputed payment issues because they might not yet be ready for judicial resolution, and said either side could ask to renew those requests. Judge Paul A. Crotty directed the parties to the separate order for the specific relief.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
K.S. v. City of New York · No. 1:21-cv-04649
Judge
Jed Rakoff
Date
May 17, 2023

Background

K.S. brought this case on behalf of herself and her minor child, D.S., against the City of New York and several city education and child-services entities and officials, as well as private service organizations and individuals named in the complaint. The opinion states that the lawsuit alleges violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act based on conduct connected to events before and after D.S.’s adoption. Motions to dismiss the second amended complaint were still pending.

D.S. is a student with disabilities under the IDEA. His individualized education plans from August 2020 through April 2023 entitled him to residential educational services provided by the New York City Department of Education (DOE). The DOE and K.S. were also litigating before an impartial hearing officer about D.S.’s access to a free appropriate public education for several school years.

After D.S. was removed from a residential facility in Massachusetts and placed in juvenile detention, K.S. sought DOE funding for a placement at the J. Flowers Health Institute in Texas under the IDEA’s “stay-put” or pendency provision. An impartial hearing officer ordered the DOE to fund Flowers as a pendency placement, subject to conditions. After the DOE did not timely pay Flowers, the court issued an earlier preliminary injunction requiring the DOE to fund Flowers and to continue funding another residential setting if D.S. could not remain there.

In April 2023, D.S. was permanently removed from Flowers because of the severity of his behavioral conditions. K.S. then identified Family First Adolescent Services (FFAS), a residential program in Florida, and sought to enroll D.S. there.

Issues and positions

K.S. moved for a mandatory temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring the City defendants, principally the DOE, to fund D.S.’s placement at FFAS. At a May 16, 2023 hearing, the parties narrowed their disagreements. They agreed to most of the relief ultimately included in the court’s separate order, including that D.S. was entitled to placement at FFAS at least temporarily.

The remaining disagreements mainly concerned the duration and scope of the DOE’s payment obligations. The opinion does not reproduce the separate order’s specific provisions.

Ruling

The court held that the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was granted in part and denied in part. It declined to address the disputed ancillary issues because it doubted their current justiciability—that is, whether those issues were sufficiently ready for a court to decide rather than being premature or abstract. The court stated that any denial of either party’s requested relief was without prejudice to renewal.

The court directed the parties to consult its separate order for the specific relief granted. The memorandum opinion was signed by United States District Judge Paul A. Crotty.

The authoritative version

Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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