Richards v. City of New York Comptroller

Background

Alroy Richards, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the City of New York, Scott Stringer in his official capacity as City Comptroller, and police officers J. Pastoriza and D. Saroff. He alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and cited 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. The court treated his constitutional allegations as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that permits lawsuits for certain constitutional violations by state or local officials.

Richards’s claims arose from two incidents and from his allegations about traffic penalties. He alleged that Officer Pastoriza failed to pursue a police report after Richards was assaulted by a manager at his former employer. He alleged that Officer Saroff made an unjustified traffic stop on October 15, 2018, acted angrily and abusively, reached toward his gun, and issued him a ticket. Richards also alleged that the City issued unjustified parking and traffic tickets, suspended his driver’s license and vehicle registration, and failed to investigate another reported attempted assault.

The defendants asked the court to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion and read Richards’s self-represented complaint liberally.

Rulings on the Individual Officers

The court dismissed Richards’s claims against Officer Pastoriza. The alleged failure to investigate or pursue Richards’s assault report did not violate the Constitution because there is generally no constitutional right to a government investigation. The court also found that Richards did not allege that the police selectively denied him protection because of race, religion, another improper consideration, or malicious intent. His Fourth Amendment theory also failed because the alleged assault was committed by a private person, and he did not allege a sufficient connection between that person’s conduct and the government.

The court also ruled that 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 create criminal liability but do not provide a private right to sue. Richards therefore could not use those statutes to pursue a civil claim or commence a criminal prosecution against Officer Pastoriza in this action.

The court allowed one claim against Officer Saroff to proceed. Although Richards described the claim as one for due process and arbitrary detention, the court construed it as a Fourth Amendment claim challenging the traffic stop. A traffic stop is a seizure, and it must be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation or other criminal activity occurred. Richards alleged that Saroff’s stated reason for the stop was untrue and that Richards had yielded before turning. Accepting those allegations as true, the court found that Richards plausibly alleged that Saroff lacked reasonable suspicion.

The court dismissed Richards’s equal-protection claim against Saroff. Richards alleged that Saroff was angry and verbally abusive and said that Richards had a protected status, but he did not identify that status or allege facts suggesting discriminatory intent or different treatment from similarly situated people. The court also noted that the later dismissal of the ticket did not necessarily establish that the stop lacked reasonable suspicion.

Rulings on the City and Scott Stringer

The court dismissed Richards’s equal-protection claim against the City. A municipality can be liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. Richards relied on his tickets and license and registration suspensions but did not identify a City policy or custom that intentionally discriminated against him based on a protected status.

The court also dismissed Richards’s due-process claims concerning the tickets. It held that New York’s parking-ticket procedures, together with available state judicial procedures, provided adequate notice and opportunities to challenge the tickets. Richards had alleged that some tickets were successfully challenged, and an exhibit showed that at least one hearing had been scheduled.

Because an official-capacity § 1983 claim against a municipal employee is treated as a claim against the municipality, the court dismissed the claims against Stringer for the same reasons it dismissed the claims against the City.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, with the exception of Richards’s claim against Saroff for allegedly initiating a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion. The conclusion states that the Third Amended Complaint was dismissed in its entirety except for that claim. The court scheduled a telephone conference to discuss the next steps in the remaining action.