Link Motion Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP

Background

Link Motion Inc. moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e), 60(a), and 60(b), and Local Civil Rule 6.3, for reconsideration of the court’s May 26, 2023 decision and order granting DLA Piper LLP (US) and Caryn G. Schechtman’s motion to dismiss. Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy that generally requires the moving party to identify controlling law or evidence the court overlooked, an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, clear error, or manifest injustice. It is not meant to let a losing party relitigate issues already decided.

The earlier dismissal rested solely on New York’s three-year statute of limitations for legal-malpractice claims. The court had found that Link Motion’s claims accrued on January 21, 2019, when the alleged malpractice occurred. It also found that the continuous-representation doctrine did not apply because Link Motion’s complaint did not establish an ongoing relationship of trust and confidence concerning the matter underlying the malpractice claims. Even assuming New York Executive Order 202.8 extended the limitations period by 228 days, the court calculated that the period would have expired on September 5, 2022, before Link Motion filed suit. The court also found that equitable tolling, including the adverse-domination theory, did not apply.

Arguments and Analysis

Link Motion challenged each of those grounds. It argued that DLA Piper continued representing it after January 21, 2019, or at least until DLA Piper gave notice of its intent to withdraw on February 4, 2019. The court disagreed. It explained that the representation described in the complaint concerned the issuance of Class B shares to an investor, not defense of the underlying securities-fraud allegations. The complaint also did not allege substantive communications initiated by Link Motion about that case after DLA Piper’s January 19, 2019 email. The court therefore reaffirmed January 21, 2019 as the accrual date.

The court also concluded that reconsideration of its analysis of Executive Order 202.8 would not help Link Motion. Even if the court’s prior discussion of the order were incorrect, the additional 228 days would still leave the claims untimely unless Link Motion could establish a later accrual date, and the court found no legal or factual basis for one.

Link Motion further argued that the adverse-domination theory should toll the limitations period because a court-appointed receiver, Robert W. Seiden, allegedly controlled Link Motion and was not a party to this action. The court rejected that argument, stating that the theory tolls the limitations period for controlling wrongdoers, not for other defendants when the alleged controlling wrongdoer is a nonparty. The court also rejected Link Motion’s argument that DLA Piper was more than passively involved in the receiver’s alleged control.

Disposition

The court held that Link Motion’s motion inappropriately relitigated previously decided issues and presented no new controlling law or evidence warranting reconsideration. It denied Link Motion’s motion for reconsideration. The court also declined Link Motion’s request to relate its claims back to the filing date of an earlier derivative case and its alternative request to revise the dismissal to one without prejudice. The court stated that the original ruling stood unchanged. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.