Steen v. Assurant, Inc.

Background

Darius Steen, William Judson, Sr., Richard Stein, Kareem Bacon, and Doug Moore sued Assurant, Inc., alleging discrimination and retaliation under Section 1981 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. They brought the case on behalf of themselves and proposed class members. The opinion describes allegations involving promotions, compensation, discipline, termination, workplace comments, and retaliation. The plaintiffs worked in different parts of Assurant’s business and lived or worked in Florida, Georgia, Maryland, the Washington, D.C. area, or other locations described in the opinion.

The complaint alleged that many relevant events occurred in the Southeast Region, including Georgia, and that several supervisors and other witnesses lived or worked in Georgia or nearby states. Moore’s allegations concerned work in the Washington, D.C. area. The plaintiffs argued that New York was connected to the case because Assurant’s headquarters had been there and because companywide employment policies allegedly originated there. Assurant later relocated its headquarters and principal executive office from New York to Atlanta, Georgia.

Motions Before the Court

Four motions were pending. Assurant moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6), and 19(a)(1), moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and filed additional facts concerning the transfer and dismissal motions. The plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint and moved to strike Assurant’s additional facts.

Motion to Strike

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to strike. It concluded that Assurant’s headquarters relocation was relevant to the transfer motion because the plaintiffs had relied on the former New York headquarters as a source of documents, witnesses, and employment policies. The court criticized Assurant for waiting until after briefing ended to disclose the relocation but decided to consider the relocation in evaluating transfer.

Transfer Analysis

Section 1404(a) allows a federal court to transfer a civil case to another district where it could have been brought when transfer would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice. The moving party must show that transfer is proper by clear and convincing evidence.

The court first held that the case could have been brought in the Northern District of Georgia. It found that Assurant was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Georgia because it had registered to do business there. Relying on Georgia law and the Supreme Court’s decision concerning consent by registration, the court concluded that Assurant had consented to general jurisdiction in Georgia. Because personal jurisdiction existed, the court also found venue proper there.

The court then weighed the convenience factors. It found that the plaintiffs’ choice of New York deserved less deference because none of the plaintiffs lived in the Southern District of New York, none of the alleged discriminatory events occurred there, and the case had little material connection to that district. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the complaint adequately connected the claims to New York through companywide policies, finding that the complaint did not identify specific policies emanating from New York and that the alleged employment decisions appeared to have been made by local managers outside New York.

The convenience-of-witnesses factor favored transfer. Assurant identified several party and nonparty witnesses in Georgia and nearby states, including Tom Bond, who the court described as a significant nonparty witness. The plaintiffs identified no witnesses located in New York. The court also found that the location of documents and sources of proof favored transfer because relevant electronic and hard-copy materials were located in or near Georgia, while Assurant no longer had its headquarters in New York.

The convenience-of-the-parties factor favored transfer because two plaintiffs lived in Georgia, two lived in Florida, one lived in Maryland, and Assurant’s headquarters had relocated to Atlanta. The locus of operative facts—the place where the events giving rise to the claims occurred—also strongly favored Georgia or other locations in the Southeastern United States rather than New York. The court found that the ability to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses favored transfer because an important nonparty witness lived in Georgia and might not be subject to a New York trial subpoena.

The court found the remaining factors neutral, including trial efficiency and the interests of justice, the parties’ relative financial means, and familiarity with the governing federal law. It concluded that no factor favored keeping the case in New York while multiple factors favored Georgia.

Disposition

The court denied the motion to strike and granted Assurant’s motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of Georgia. The court did not reach Assurant’s motion to dismiss or the plaintiffs’ motion to amend. The clerk was directed to close the transfer motion.