Foster v. Dula

Background

Cordia Foster and Cislyn Wright brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the New York State Human Rights Law concerning alleged racial discrimination in their employment as caregivers. The opinion describes allegations that Elyse Dula and Ian K. Snow treated the plaintiffs differently from white employees, reduced their pay, and terminated them. The defendants disputed important facts, including whether Dula made racist statements and why the plaintiffs’ pay was reduced and their employment ended.

The decision addressed motions in limine, which are requests for trial-related rulings on what evidence may be presented to the jury.

Plaintiffs’ Motions

The plaintiffs moved to preclude testimony about a pending wage-and-hours lawsuit between the parties. Because the defendants agreed that no reference to that lawsuit should be made at trial, the court granted the motion at Docket 49.

Foster separately moved to preclude testimony about a dismissed criminal charge brought against her in connection with an alleged domestic-violence incident involving her boyfriend. The court granted that motion at Docket 46.

Defendants’ Punitive-Damages Motion

The defendants moved to bifurcate the trial concerning punitive damages or to preclude those damages altogether. The court denied the motion at Docket 44. It ordered that there would be one trial. The court held that the plaintiffs’ failure to conduct discovery about the defendants’ wealth did not prevent them from seeking punitive damages, but because discovery had ended, the plaintiffs could not conduct additional discovery on that subject.

The court explained that it would decide after the plaintiffs presented their case whether there was enough evidence to instruct the jury on punitive damages and whether the jury could assess them properly. The opinion did not make a final ruling that punitive damages would be submitted to the jury.

Expert-Testimony Motion

The defendants moved under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to preclude testimony from the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jennie Weiner, concerning “social frameworking.” The court found that the motion was filed too late under the judge’s individual rules, which required Daubert motions to be made at the time set for dispositive motions rather than as motions in limine. The court nevertheless considered the motion because the proposed testimony raised issues that needed to be resolved before trial.

The court found Dr. Weiner qualified to testify about social frameworking and stereotypes. Her proposed testimony concerned two stereotypes of Black women: the “Mammy” stereotype, described as involving expectations of docility, subservience, nurturing, and obedience, and the “Sapphire” stereotype, described as involving expectations of defiance, hostility, assertiveness, and aggression.

The court concluded that limited testimony could assist the jury in evaluating the plaintiffs’ account of a change in the defendants’ behavior. Dr. Weiner could explain the two stereotypes and answer a hypothetical question assuming the plaintiffs’ version of events, including an alleged racist remark and later changes in workplace treatment. She could testify about whether the assumed change was consistent with the forms of stereotyping she described.

Dr. Weiner could not testify about whether the specific events actually occurred, whether the defendants made the disputed statements, or whether the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs. She also could not testify that the “Sapphire” stereotype showed that the plaintiffs were dishonest or criminal, or that it reinforced other stereotypes about Black people. If the jury rejected the facts underlying the hypothetical, it would have to disregard her testimony.

If Dr. Weiner testified, the defendants’ expert, Dr. Mitchell, could offer limited rebuttal testimony that the research supported explaining the defendants’ conduct through information about the individuals rather than stereotyping. The court stated that neither expert’s report would be admitted into evidence because the reports were hearsay; only live testimony could be admitted. The opinion does not state a separate formal “granted” or “denied” disposition for the defendants’ expert-testimony motion, but it expressly imposed these limits on the proposed testimony.

Disposition

The court granted the plaintiffs’ two motions in limine, denied the defendants’ punitive-damages motion, and set limits governing any testimony from Dr. Weiner and Dr. Mitchell. It directed the clerk to remove Docket Nos. 41, 44, 46, and 49 from the list of open motions.