Brown v. Montefiore Medical Center

Background

Guelda E. Brown, who represented herself, sued Montefiore Medical Center and Diane Rodriguez, Aretha Mack, Veronica Crute, Anthony Leung, and Russell Reille. She alleged race, national-origin, religious, and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She also asserted claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act and state-law claims for assault, negligence, and breach of contract.

The court had previously dismissed the sex-discrimination, Family and Medical Leave Act, assault, negligence, and breach-of-contract claims. It also dismissed all claims against Reille. The remaining defendants Montefiore, Mack, Crute, and Leung moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence requires a trial or instead permits judgment as a matter of law.

Brown alleged that Rodriguez made a comment about Dominicans, restricted her use of Spanish, denied or limited leave and training, and treated her differently because she was a Jehovah’s Witness. She alleged that Mack called her “Satan” and “the devil,” restricted her communications at work, threatened her, and withheld phone messages. She alleged that Leung improperly coded medical leave and reprimanded her for using a humidifier and peppermint oil. She alleged that Crute threatened her after Brown reported Crute’s personal phone call at work. Brown also claimed that these defendants retaliated against her after she complained to Montefiore.

Hostile-Work-Environment Claims

The court granted summary judgment to Montefiore, Mack, Crute, and Leung on Brown’s hostile-work-environment claims under Title VII, Section 1981, and the New York State Human Rights Law.

For Rodriguez’s conduct, the court found that the single remark about Dominicans was episodic and not sufficiently severe. The court also found that Brown lacked evidence connecting the leave decisions, vacation-time deduction, counseling about lunch breaks, lack of software-update training, Christmas-related questions, gift bag, and exclusion from a photograph to Brown’s race, national origin, or religion. The court noted that Montefiore’s leave policy gave priority to more senior employees and that Mack and Crute were senior to Brown.

As to Leung, the court emphasized that he did not know Brown’s race, national origin, or religion when the challenged conduct occurred. The court therefore concluded that Brown could not show that Leung’s conduct occurred because of a protected characteristic.

As to Mack, the court found that Mack did not know Brown was a Jehovah’s Witness until Mack read the complaint. The court concluded that Mack’s references to “Satan” and “demons” were shown by the evidence to be responses to Brown’s workplace complaints, not comments about Brown’s religion. The court also found no evidence that Mack’s restrictions on Brown’s conversations, threats, or handling of phone messages were motivated by Brown’s race, national origin, or religion.

As to Crute, the court found that the alleged threat followed Brown’s report about Crute’s personal phone call and that Brown had offered no evidence connecting the threat to race, national origin, or religion.

Retaliation Claims

The court also granted summary judgment to Montefiore, Mack, Crute, and Leung on Brown’s retaliation claims under Title VII, Section 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

The court ruled that Brown’s January 2018 complaint to Leung about Mack’s directives was not protected activity because Brown complained that Mack was not her supervisor, rather than complaining about discrimination based on a protected characteristic. Brown’s February 2018 report about Crute’s personal phone call likewise was not protected activity.

The court found that Brown’s December 8, 2015 complaint to Montefiore’s compliance hotline about Rodriguez’s gift of a “dirty green canvas bag” could be understood as a complaint about religious discrimination and therefore was protected activity. But Brown did not show that she experienced an adverse work event because of that complaint, or that any event connected to it would likely deter a reasonable person from making a discrimination complaint. The court therefore concluded that Brown had not established the required initial case for retaliation.

New York City Human Rights Law Claim

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear a related state or city claim after the federal claims are resolved—over Brown’s remaining hostile-work-environment claim under the New York City Human Rights Law. The court explained that the city law uses different and generally broader standards than the federal and state claims. It dismissed that claim without prejudice.

Disposition

The court granted summary judgment to Montefiore, Mack, Crute, and Leung on Brown’s hostile-work-environment claims under Title VII, Section 1981, and the New York State Human Rights Law, and on her retaliation claims under Title VII, Section 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the New York City hostile-work-environment claim and dismissed that claim without prejudice.

Rodriguez did not appear or join the motion. The court ordered Brown to show cause by August 7, 2023, why her claims against Rodriguez should not be dismissed. The court stated that the case would remain open while that issue was pending.