Elgalad v. New York City Department Of Education

Background

Ahmed M. Elgalad, proceeding without a lawyer, was employed as a teacher by the New York City Department of Education and primarily taught physical education. He identified his race as white and his religion as Muslim and said he was raised in Egypt. After a 2014 dispute with another teacher, Elgalad had interactions with Assistant Principal Kabeya Mbuyi and Principal Michelle Rochon. He claimed that Mbuyi made comments about his religion and later discriminated against him. Elgalad also told Rochon that Mbuyi was discriminating against him.

Elgalad reported discrimination to the Department of Education’s Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management in December 2014. The record then included disciplinary meetings, a medical evaluation requested by Rochon, negative classroom evaluations, disciplinary letters, and administrative charges. In 2016, Assigned Principal Livingstone Hilaire allegedly told Elgalad to stop filing discrimination complaints against Mbuyi and Rochon and said, according to Elgalad, “we will get you” if he pursued charges against Rochon. Elgalad was later adjudicated responsible for being late to work and improperly questioning a student, fined $1,000, and reassigned to Absent Teacher Reserve duty, while retaining the same compensation.

After an earlier ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss, the remaining claims were Elgalad’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the Department of Education and Mbuyi, and his claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law against Rochon, Mbuyi, and Hilaire. Defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence presents a genuine dispute requiring a trial.

Federal Section 1981 Claims

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the § 1981 claims against the Department of Education and Mbuyi. It explained that, under controlling Second Circuit precedent, § 1981 claims against state or municipal actors are treated as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute that permits certain civil-rights claims against state and local officials. A claim against a municipality requires evidence that the challenged conduct resulted from a municipal policy or custom. The court held that the record did not identify a policy or custom that could support liability against the Department of Education or Mbuyi under the governing precedent. The court also stated that a New York City school principal does not have municipal policymaking authority for this purpose.

Discrimination Claims

The court granted summary judgment dismissing Elgalad’s discrimination claims under both the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law against Rochon, Mbuyi, and Hilaire. The court first analyzed the city-law claim, which uses a broader standard than the state-law claim. Even under that broader standard, the court found no evidence that similarly situated non-Egyptian or non-Muslim colleagues were treated differently under comparable circumstances. Because the city-law discrimination claim failed for lack of comparator evidence, the similarly based state-law discrimination claim also failed.

Retaliation Claims

The court granted summary judgment as to the retaliation claims against Hilaire. Although Hilaire’s alleged warning had evidentiary value, the court found no evidence that Hilaire knew about Elgalad’s discrimination complaints when Hilaire gave Elgalad a negative evaluation in 2015, and no evidence that Hilaire took a legally significant adverse action connected to those complaints.

The court denied summary judgment on Elgalad’s New York State and New York City retaliation claims against Rochon and Mbuyi. It found that Elgalad had engaged in protected activity by reporting that Mbuyi discriminated against him, and that the record could support an inference that Rochon and Mbuyi knew about those complaints. The court also found that the series of disciplinary meetings, medical evaluation, disciplinary letters, and related actions could have discouraged a reasonable worker from reporting discrimination.

Defendants offered poor work performance and bad behavior as legitimate reasons for their actions. But the court found that Elgalad had identified shifting and inconsistent explanations, including inconsistencies concerning the 2013 verbal-abuse allegation and Rochon’s medical-evaluation letters. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Elgalad, the court held that a jury could find the stated reasons were a pretext for retaliation. Because the retaliation claims survived under the state law, the corresponding city-law claims also survived.

Disposition

The court’s order states that defendants’ motion for summary judgment was GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion was granted as to the § 1981 claims against the Department of Education and Mbuyi; the New York City and New York State discrimination claims against Rochon, Mbuyi, and Hilaire; and the retaliation claims against Hilaire. The claims against Hilaire were also dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) because no timely substitution was made after notice of his death. The motion was denied as to the New York State and New York City retaliation claims against Rochon and Mbuyi.

No claims remained against the Department of Education or Hilaire. Although all federal claims had been dismissed, the court retained jurisdiction over the surviving state and city retaliation claims because of the judicial resources already used in the case. The court advised Elgalad that he might be able to seek appointment of pro bono counsel.