Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Tufamerica, Inc.

Background

Bridgeport Music, Inc. and Westbound Records, Inc. sought declarations that they owned six George Clinton compositions, that TufAmerica, Inc. and Kay Lovelace Taylor had no valid ownership claims, and that the plaintiffs had not infringed copyrights allegedly owned by the defendants. TufAmerica and Taylor asserted counterclaims seeking a declaration that TufAmerica owned the compositions, damages for copyright infringement, and an accounting of damages from the plaintiffs’ alleged commercial exploitation.

The dispute involved six compositions: “The Victor,” also known as “Baby I Owe You Something Good”; “Good Old Music”; “Let’s Make It Last”; “I’ll Wait,” also known as “I’ll Stay”; “Can You Get to That,” also known as “What You Been Growing”; and “The Goose (That Laid the Golden Egg).” George Clinton, who was not a party to the case, was the author or co-author. Clinton recorded for Revilot Records before that label’s bankruptcy in the late 1960s, and later re-recorded most of the compositions with Funkadelic for Westbound Records. “The Goose” was recorded with Parliament and released by Casablanca Records.

The plaintiffs relied on agreements and copyright registrations that they said transferred ownership or recording rights from Clinton and others. The defendants relied on earlier copyright registrations naming LeBaron Taylor or entities associated with him, images of record labels, and Clinton’s testimony that he did not sign or did not recall signing several of the plaintiffs’ agreements. The court noted that the Revilot Agreement was not submitted and that the evidence did not clearly establish the relationship among Revilot, Groovesville, Clinton, and Taylor.

Ownership claim

The court held that material factual disputes prevented summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim that they owned the compositions. Because the compositions were created and the relevant events occurred before 1978, the court applied the 1909 Copyright Act. Under that law, a copyright transfer had to be made through a written instrument signed by the copyright owner.

Neither side provided reliable evidence establishing when the compositions were first published. That timing mattered because a copyright registration made before or within five years after first publication can receive a presumption of validity, while the evidentiary weight of a later registration is left to the court’s discretion. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown that their registrations were filed within the relevant five-year period, so their registrations did not receive the statutory presumption of ownership.

The defendants’ evidence also created factual disputes. Their earlier registrations identified Taylor or Taylor-affiliated entities as claimants for five of the six compositions. Clinton testified that he had not signed, or could not confirm signing, several agreements on which the plaintiffs relied. The court also found that Clinton’s testimony about the Revilot Agreement, Groovesville, and Taylor was unclear. Because a court deciding summary judgment may not weigh evidence or decide witness credibility, the ownership issue could not be resolved as a matter of law.

Statute of limitations

The Copyright Act generally requires a civil action to be filed within three years after the claim accrues. The court treated ownership as the central issue underlying the parties’ infringement claims because ownership was disputed.

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ claims were too late. The plaintiffs filed the case in January 2018, shortly after TufAmerica sent a December 2017 letter claiming ownership. The court found that the defendants had not shown that the plaintiffs earlier received sufficient notice that Taylor or his affiliated entities were asserting an adverse ownership claim. Earlier copyright registrations, without more, were not enough. The court also found that the evidence did not show that Taylor or his affiliated entities had continued exploiting the compositions in a way that clearly repudiated the plaintiffs’ claimed ownership during the relevant period. The plaintiffs’ claims therefore were not time-barred.

The court reached the opposite conclusion for the defendants’ counterclaims. It held that the counterclaims accrued no later than 2011, when TufAmerica purchased rights from Taylor’s widow, Kay Lovelace Taylor. At that time, she had no paperwork confirming her claimed ownership, objected to representing that she had valid signed agreements with the relevant artists and rights owners, and directed that this representation be removed from the agreement. TufAmerica also did not search the copyright records before purchasing the interest, although a search would have revealed multiple registrations.

The court further held that, if the defendants were Taylor’s successors in interest, they were bound by the earlier circumstances showing that Taylor knew the compositions were being exploited by another record company without him receiving royalties. The defendants’ ownership, infringement, and accounting counterclaims were therefore time-barred. The court did not reach the plaintiffs’ separate argument that Taylor’s widow had failed to transfer valid rights to TufAmerica.

Disposition

The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to the defendants’ counterclaims and otherwise denied the motion. It did not resolve ownership of the compositions. The court directed that the case proceed to trial on September 5, 2023.