Fontil v. Swain

Background

Raychel Fontil filed this pro se civil-rights action against Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain. The filing fee had been paid. Fontil’s allegations concerned orders that Chief Judge Swain had issued in an earlier case brought by Fontil in connection with her father Philander Philippeaux’s criminal proceedings and later challenge to his conviction.

In the earlier case, Fontil alleged that Judge Ronnie Abrams had violated Philippeaux’s rights while handling his motion to vacate his conviction. Fontil sought relief related to Philippeaux’s confinement. Chief Judge Swain dismissed that complaint as legally frivolous. After Fontil challenged the earlier order’s description of an attached grand-jury transcript as “partial,” Chief Judge Swain issued a later order granting relief to the extent that the transcript from the specified proceeding had been incorrectly characterized as partial.

In this action, Fontil alleged that Chief Judge Swain had lied about the transcript, failed to take judicial notice of it, and replaced one alleged misstatement with another in the later order. Fontil invoked federal civil-rights statutes and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. She sought declaratory and injunctive orders requiring Chief Judge Swain to stop allegedly misdescribing the transcript, take judicial notice of it, and provide other transcripts.

Court’s analysis

Because the complaint asserted constitutional claims against a federal judicial officer, the court construed the claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which provides a potential damages remedy for certain constitutional violations by federal officials. The court noted that Fontil sought declaratory and injunctive relief instead of monetary damages.

The court held that Fontil’s requests for injunctive relief were barred by judicial immunity. Under the rule discussed by the court, injunctive relief against a judicial officer is unavailable unless a declaratory judgment was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. Fontil did not allege either circumstance.

The court also held that Fontil could not use a new lawsuit against the judge to obtain review of an earlier dismissal order. The proper procedures were to seek reconsideration in the earlier case or appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court further ruled that Fontil could not obtain declaratory relief based on alleged past conduct because she did not allege an ongoing or future violation of federal law.

The court rejected Fontil’s reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That statute can allow a prevailing party to recover certain attorney fees, but it is not an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. The court also stated that a person proceeding without a lawyer is not entitled to attorney fees under that statute. As a result, Fontil did not state a claim under § 1988.

Disposition

The court dismissed the Complaint as legally frivolous. It declined to grant leave to amend because the defects could not be cured by amendment. The court warned that further nonmeritorious or duplicative lawsuits concerning Philippeaux’s criminal proceedings could lead to an order requiring Fontil to explain why she should not be barred from filing related actions in the Southern District of New York.

The court certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-waiver status for an appeal. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the case and mail the order to Fontil.