Court, Explained
U.S. Federal District Courts
←Back to docket
S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Aug. 28, 2023

Jones-Bey v. Sirius-El

Judge
Laura Swain
Docket
1:23-cv-06371
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
13
Civil ProcedurePro SeSection 1983
In one sentence

In Jones-Bey v. Sirius-El, Judge Swain dismissed the complaint but allowed 30 days to amend state-law claims showing federal diversity jurisdiction.

Who this affects

Sister E. Jones-Bey’s claims were dismissed or limited, while she was allowed 30 days to amend her state-law claims. Any claims asserted on behalf of the Lyrics Playhouse Moorish Sudbury Institute were dismissed without prejudice. The individual defendants were not required to answer because the complaint was dismissed at the screening stage.

What happened

In Jones-Bey v. Sirius-El, Sister E. Jones-Bey sued several Moorish Science Temple officials, alleging constitutional violations, misuse of her intellectual property, defamation, discrimination, and other misconduct. She also listed the Lyrics Playhouse Moorish Sudbury Institute as a plaintiff, although she was representing herself without a lawyer.

The court dismissed claims brought for the Institute because a nonlawyer may represent only herself. It dismissed Jones-Bey’s constitutional claims because the defendants were private individuals and the complaint did not allege that they acted for the government. It also dismissed her claims under federal criminal statutes because private citizens cannot order federal criminal prosecutions. The court found that the complaint did not establish the parties’ citizenship or show that the state-law claims exceeded $75,000, as required for diversity jurisdiction.

Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, granted Jones-Bey 30 days to amend her state-law claims to show diversity jurisdiction, and denied leave to amend the remaining claims because amendment would be futile. The court also denied fee-free status for an appeal, certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Jones-Bey v. Sirius-El · No. 1:23-cv-06371
Judge
Laura Swain
Date
Aug. 28, 2023

Background

Sister E. Jones-Bey, appearing without a lawyer, sued Yusef Sirius-El, Robert Jones-Bey doing business as Moorish Science Temple of America Inc., D. Clark-El, and Walter Clendenin-Bey. The complaint also named the Lyrics Playhouse Moorish Sudbury Institute as a plaintiff, although the body of the complaint did not list it among the plaintiffs.

Jones-Bey invoked federal-question jurisdiction and alleged that the defendants violated the First Amendment, several federal criminal statutes, and 28 U.S.C. § 1651. She alleged that the defendants used extortion and blackmail to interfere with her progress in the organization, failed to provide a letter verifying her membership, used her intellectual property without acknowledgment or payment, sought information about her business to boycott or blacklist it, and failed to refund dues or explain their use. She also alleged emotional distress and financial losses.

In an attached affidavit, Jones-Bey alleged discrimination based on familial status, sexual orientation, and disability; defamatory statements; exclusion from meetings; and interference with her religious practices and personal relationships. She sought money damages and a protection order for herself, her offspring, business clients, students, and associates.

Claims on Behalf of the Institute

The court held that Jones-Bey could not assert claims on behalf of the Lyrics Playhouse Moorish Sudbury Institute because a nonlawyer may represent only her own interests. The court dismissed without prejudice any claims she was asserting on behalf of the Institute.

Constitutional Claims

The court treated Jones-Bey’s constitutional claims as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state such a claim, she had to allege both a violation of a federal right and action under color of state law—that is, action by someone acting for the state or another government body. The court found that the complaint identified the defendants as private parties and did not allege that they worked for a state or other government body. It therefore dismissed Jones-Bey’s constitutional claims against those defendants for failure to state a claim.

Federal Criminal Statutes

Jones-Bey attempted to assert claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513 and 1831. The court held that she could not use those federal criminal statutes to initiate or control a criminal prosecution. It dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim. The court also noted that there are no provisions of Title 18 corresponding to §§ 12132 and 12133, which the complaint also appeared to cite.

State-Law Claims and Jurisdiction

To the extent Jones-Bey asserted defamation or slander claims, the court treated them as state-law claims. Federal diversity jurisdiction requires the plaintiff and defendants to be citizens of different states and requires the amount in dispute to exceed $75,000.

Jones-Bey alleged that she was a resident of New York and gave New York addresses for Sirius-El, Clendenin-Bey, and Carter-El, but she did not provide an address for Jones-Bey. The court found that the complaint did not establish that the parties were citizens of different states. It also directed that any amended complaint allege facts showing that the claims were worth more than $75,000. The court explained that an address might be an employment or temple address rather than a person’s legal domicile, so additional facts might establish diversity jurisdiction.

The court granted Jones-Bey 30 days to amend and replead her state-law claims while alleging facts supporting diversity jurisdiction. If she did not amend, or if the amended complaint did not establish diversity jurisdiction, the court stated that it would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). It granted 30 days’ leave to replead the state-law claims and denied leave to replead the remaining claims because amendment would be futile. The court stated that no summons would issue at that time and that failure to file a sufficient amended complaint could result in entry of judgment dismissing the complaint. Judge Laura Taylor Swain also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal.

The authoritative version

Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
Summary written with AI assistance. See how summaries are made. Spot something wrong? Tell us.