Grytsyk v. Morales

Background

Petro Grytsyk brought a civil-rights lawsuit arising from his arrest in April 2016 and 21 summonses issued between June 1 and October 14, 2018, concerning his street vending near 701 Seventh Avenue in New York City. The remaining claims were false arrest and malicious prosecution against Lieutenant Sujat Khan and Officer Anthony Morales based on the 2016 incident, and malicious abuse of process against 11 officers based on the later summonses.

New York City rules prohibited food and general vending on the relevant part of Seventh Avenue during specified daytime hours. The parties disputed whether Grytsyk was vending after noon on April 18, 2016, whether his table and nearby scaffolding blocked pedestrian traffic, and whether he physically obstructed the officers. It was undisputed that Khan and Morales ordered Grytsyk several times to close his display and that he refused. Morales arrested him at Khan’s direction. The charges of obstructing governmental administration and disorderly conduct were later dismissed and sealed after the time for a speedy trial expired.

Summary-judgment standard

The defendants sought summary judgment on all remaining claims. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view disputed evidence and reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion; it may not decide witness credibility or choose between conflicting accounts.

False arrest

For the false-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants argued that probable cause—or, alternatively, arguable probable cause—supported the arrest. Probable cause means facts known to the officers that would lead a reasonable person to believe an offense had been committed. Arguable probable cause is the related qualified-immunity standard: an officer is protected if it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed, or if reasonable officers could disagree about that question.

The court held that the defendants had not established probable cause or arguable probable cause as a matter of law. Regarding obstructing governmental administration, the court identified disputes about the time of Grytsyk’s vending and whether his table obstructed traffic. The defendants also did not explain why the orders to move were legally authorized, and the court found that Grytsyk’s protest of the orders, without more, did not establish the required obstruction or interference. The defendants also did not address the offense’s intent requirement adequately.

The court likewise rejected the defendants’ arguments concerning disorderly conduct. The defendants did not explain how the elements of that offense applied to Grytsyk’s conduct, and the court noted that Grytsyk disputed whether his conduct inconvenienced pedestrian traffic. As to the vending regulations, the court assumed without deciding that vending at the stated time and place could violate the rules, but found a factual dispute about whether Grytsyk was actually vending then. The court therefore denied summary judgment and qualified immunity on the false-arrest claim.

Malicious prosecution

A malicious-prosecution claim requires, among other things, a criminal proceeding initiated or continued by the defendants, a favorable end to that proceeding, lack of probable cause, actual malice, and a post-arraignment restraint on liberty. The defendants relied on their false-arrest probable-cause arguments and did not identify additional facts supporting probable cause for the prosecution.

For the same reasons discussed under false arrest, the court could not decide at summary judgment that probable cause or arguable probable cause existed. The court also explained that, under the cited authority, lack of probable cause generally permits an inference of malice sufficient to defeat summary judgment, even though Grytsyk might ultimately be unable to prove malice at trial. The court therefore denied summary judgment on the malicious-prosecution claim.

Malicious abuse of process

To prove malicious abuse of process, Grytsyk had to show that the defendants used regularly issued legal process with intent to harm and to obtain a collateral objective outside the legitimate purpose of that process. A collateral objective is an improper purpose separate from the ordinary purpose of the legal process; an improper motive alone is not enough.

Grytsyk relied primarily on a video that he said showed officers explaining that businesses near his vending location did not want him there. He argued that the summonses were issued to drive him out of business. The court did not decide whether the video was admissible because, even considering it, the evidence showed at most that officers believed Grytsyk was vending unlawfully and that complaints influenced their decision to order him to move. The court found that the video did not reasonably support an inference that the defendants issued the summonses to ruin his business or achieve another improper collateral objective. It therefore granted summary judgment to the defendants on this claim.

Disposition

Judge Rochon granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed Grytsyk’s malicious-abuse-of-process claim and denied summary judgment on the false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims. The order directed the parties to propose jury-trial dates and submit a joint pretrial order and related materials. The opinion does not state that the dismissed claim was dismissed with or without prejudice.