Owens v. Orange County Jail

Background

DeSean J. Owens, who was representing himself, was a prisoner awaiting sentencing at the Orange County Jail. He alleged that, from December 2020 through September 2022, his Delta 2 housing unit received three 30-minute visitation sessions per week, totaling 90 minutes. He alleged that New York regulations required at least two hours of weekly visitation for county-jail prisoners.

Owens filed a grievance stating that the visitation schedule violated those regulations. A grievance coordinator stated that an additional visitation day would be added, but Owens alleged that this did not happen. Owens later sent Sheriff DuBois and Captain Potter a letter repeating his concerns and explaining that the Tuesday, Thursday, and Sunday schedule conflicted with the work schedule of his children’s mother. He alleged that Potter did not respond.

Owens filed this action on August 8, 2022. The court previously gave him permission to amend, but he did not file an amended complaint. The defendants then moved to dismiss, and Owens did not oppose the motion. The court nevertheless evaluated whether the complaint stated a legally sufficient claim.

Due Process Claim

The court treated Owens’s allegations as asserting a procedural due-process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. It assumed, for purposes of the motion, that the defendants failed to provide the two hours of visitation required by New York regulation.

The court held that this alleged failure to follow a state prison regulation did not itself create a federally protected liberty interest. It also held that Owens had not alleged the kind of “atypical and significant hardship” required for a state-created liberty interest. He still received 90 minutes of visitation each week, and the conflict between the visitation schedule and his family’s work schedule did not change that conclusion. The court dismissed the procedural due-process claim.

The court also stated that, even if Owens had adequately alleged a due-process violation, the claim against Potter would fail because the complaint did not allege Potter’s personal involvement. Sending Potter a letter that he did not answer was not enough, by itself, to establish personal involvement in the visitation decision.

Equal-Protection Claims

The court liberally construed the complaint as raising equal-protection theories because Owens alleged that other housing units received two hours, or four sessions, of visitation each week while Delta 2 received less.

The court found no sufficient selective-enforcement claim because Owens did not allege that the difference was motivated by discrimination, retaliation, malice, or another impermissible purpose. The court also considered a possible “class-of-one” claim, which applies when a person alleges intentional treatment different from similarly situated persons without a rational basis. It held that Owens had not provided enough facts showing that Delta 2 was extremely similar to the other housing units. The complaint indicated that Delta 2 differed in size from at least some comparison units and did not establish that the difference in treatment was not a mistake or lacked a legitimate prison-related reason.

The court dismissed the equal-protection claims as pleaded but allowed Owens to replead the possible class-of-one claim because additional facts might cure those pleading deficiencies.

Familial-Association Claim

The court dismissed any claim based on a First Amendment right to associate with family members. It explained that incarceration permits reasonable restrictions on family visits and that prisoners do not have an absolute right to visits at a particular time. Owens alleged that he received regular visits on three days each week, not that all visitation was withdrawn or that he was intentionally or maliciously denied visitation. The court therefore found that the alleged schedule did not sufficiently curtail his family association rights.

County Liability

The court dismissed the claims against the County of Orange under the municipal-liability doctrine commonly associated with Monell. A municipality can be liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation. Because the court found no underlying constitutional violation, it held that the County could not be liable on the allegations in the complaint.

Disposition

Judge Seibel granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The order permitted Owens to file an amended complaint by October 25, 2023, raising only the possible class-of-one equal-protection claim if he could allege facts meeting the pleading requirements. The court did not reach the defendants’ separate arguments about damages because it dismissed the substantive claims. If Owens did not amend by the deadline, the court stated that it would enter judgment for the defendants and close the case.