Taylor v. Brown Brothers Harriman

Background

Kenny Taylor, a Manhattan resident proceeding without a lawyer, sued Brown Brothers Harriman and three defendants identified as John Doe (Concierge). Taylor alleged that on August 21, 2023, he was exercising his right to free speech in front of Brown Brothers Harriman’s property at 140 Broadway in Manhattan. He alleged that three or four security or concierge employees told him he could not express himself because the property was private. He further alleged that the defendants threatened to call emergency medical services and police to remove him. Taylor sought money damages for mental and emotional harm and asked the court to state that private-property owners may not violate New York law or citizens’ rights.

The court had previously allowed Taylor to proceed without prepaying filing fees. Because he was proceeding without prepayment, the court was required to screen the complaint and dismiss it if it was frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also explained that a complaint must provide enough factual detail to make liability plausible under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Federal Civil-Rights Claims

The court construed Taylor’s federal-question allegations as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a way to seek relief for violations of federal rights, but the defendant must have acted under color of state law—that is, as a state actor or through authority fairly attributable to the government.

The court held that Taylor had not stated a Section 1983 claim against Brown Brothers Harriman because he described it as a private entity and did not allege that it worked for a state or other government body. The court also found that Taylor had not alleged facts showing that the concierge defendants were state actors. The complaint alleged only that they worked for Brown Brothers Harriman. The court stated that Taylor would need to allege facts showing that the defendants’ actions were fairly attributable to the state and showing how each individual defendant was personally involved in violating his rights.

State-Law Claims

The court stated that it could decline supplemental jurisdiction—its authority to hear related state-law claims—if all claims within its original federal jurisdiction were dismissed. Because Taylor was being given an opportunity to amend, the court deferred deciding whether it would exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The court granted Taylor leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days. It directed him to identify the individuals involved, provide facts about what each defendant did or failed to do, state when and where the events occurred, describe his injuries, and specify the relief sought. If he did not know a defendant’s name, he could use a John Doe or Jane Doe designation, but the court warned that doing so would not pause the three-year limitations period and that Taylor would be responsible for identifying the person and amending the complaint in time.

The amended complaint would replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint, so Taylor would have to repeat any facts or claims he wanted the court to consider. The court ordered that it be submitted to the court’s Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days, labeled as an amended complaint, and marked with docket number 23-CV-7424 (LTS). No summons would issue at that time. The court stated that if Taylor failed to comply and could not show good cause, the complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Taylor permission to appeal without prepaying fees.