Walker v. Department of Correction

Background

Kevin Walker filed this self-represented lawsuit while detained at the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island. He named New York City, the New York City Department of Correction, and unnamed persons as defendants. The court understood the complaint to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows claims for violations of federal rights by state or local officials, as well as state-law claims.

Walker alleged that Department of Correction personnel interfered with or blocked his mail, seized evidence, threatened or arranged assaults against him, denied him medical care, and retaliated against him for helping another prisoner, Andre Antrobus. He described back and head injuries and sought approximately $2,000,000 in damages. He also appeared to request appointment of a free lawyer.

Screening and claims

Because Walker was a prisoner proceeding without paying filing fees in advance, the court screened his complaint under the federal prisoner-screening statutes. Those statutes require dismissal of claims that are frivolous, fail to state a claim, seek relief from an immune defendant, or fall outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also applied the rule requiring a complaint to provide enough facts to make a claim plausible.

The court dismissed without prejudice Walker’s claims asserted on behalf of Antrobus. It explained that a person representing himself generally may litigate only his own interests, and Walker had not alleged that he was an attorney.

The court dismissed Walker’s claims against the Department of Correction for failure to state a claim because, as a City agency, the Department is not a separate entity that can be sued. The court also found that Walker had not alleged enough facts to state a § 1983 claim against New York City. A municipality is not liable merely because one of its employees allegedly acted wrongfully; Walker needed to allege a City policy, custom, or practice that caused the alleged constitutional violation. The court allowed him to try to correct that deficiency.

The complaint named only “unnamed persons,” but the court understood Walker to be referring to individual members of the Anna M. Kross Center staff, possibly including Correction Officer Colon. The court explained that a § 1983 damages claim requires each individual defendant’s direct and personal involvement. It granted Walker leave to identify those individuals and allege what each person did.

The court considered Walker’s allegations about mail and evidence as possible First Amendment claims involving access to the courts and mail tampering. For access to the courts, Walker needed to identify a nonfrivolous legal claim that was actually hindered and explain why any lawyer representing him could not pursue it. The court found that he had not done so. For mail tampering, Walker needed facts showing regular and unjustified interference, including the number, dates, and manner of the alleged incidents. The court allowed him to add those facts.

The court also found insufficient facts for Walker’s possible First Amendment retaliation claim. He did not clearly identify protected conduct, show a causal connection between that conduct and the alleged adverse actions, or identify the staff members who retaliated against him. The court allowed him to amend those allegations. The court likewise found that his conspiracy allegations were vague and conclusory and allowed him to identify the alleged conspirators and provide specific facts about any agreement and resulting injury.

Disposition

The court granted Walker 60 days to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint must replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint and must identify the defendants, describe each defendant’s conduct and the relevant dates and locations, explain his injuries, and state the relief requested. The court said that no summonses would issue at that time.

If Walker failed to amend within the permitted period without good cause, the court said it would issue an order dismissing his claims asserted on Antrobus’s behalf without prejudice, dismissing his own federal claims for failure to state a claim, and declining to consider his state-law claims under supplemental jurisdiction. The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal. The order was signed by Chief United States District Judge Laura Taylor Swain.