Raymond v. 1199 SEIU National Benefit Fund

Background

Raymond brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, alleging that 1199SEIU National Benefit Fund failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability and terminated his employment because of his disability.

On July 20, 2023, the court ruled on the Fund’s motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion as to Raymond’s failure-to-accommodate claim, finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the Fund refused to make reasonable accommodations in response to his requests. The court denied summary judgment as to the discriminatory-termination claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the Fund terminated Raymond because of his disability rather than because he was unable or unwilling to perform his job.

Motion for Reconsideration

The Fund moved under Local Rule 6.3 for reconsideration of the discriminatory-termination ruling. It asked the court to grant summary judgment in its favor on that claim and dismiss Raymond’s complaint in its entirety with prejudice. The Fund argued that, because the court had ruled against Raymond on the accommodation claim, he could not establish that the Fund terminated him because of his disability.

Raymond opposed the motion. He argued that the Fund had not identified an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, clear error, or manifest injustice, and that the Fund was attempting to relitigate issues and evidence already decided.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy that is generally available only when the moving party identifies controlling decisions or information the court overlooked, newly available evidence, an intervening change in controlling law, clear error, or the need to prevent manifest injustice. It is not a way to relitigate old issues or take a second opportunity to present arguments.

The court found that the Fund did not allege clear error or identify newly discovered evidence. Instead, it relied on evidence already presented during summary-judgment briefing. The court also rejected the Fund’s argument that the earlier summary-judgment decision itself represented a significant change in the law or circumstances.

The court further held that proceeding to trial on the discriminatory-termination claim would not create manifest injustice. Although the Fund offered a plausible account that Raymond would return to work only if reassigned to a particular area, the court found that this was not the only plausible account. The evidence also indicated that the Fund’s human-resources department told Raymond he could return only with medical clearance without restrictions, while the earlier record included the Fund’s determination that it could not accommodate his doctor’s restrictions and Raymond’s willingness to discuss possible accommodations. The court stated that determining the reason for Raymond’s termination was for the jury because a genuine evidentiary dispute remained.

Disposition

The court denied the Fund’s motion for reconsideration. The clerk was directed to close the motion. The opinion did not alter the earlier ruling that granted summary judgment on the failure-to-accommodate claim and denied summary judgment on the discriminatory-termination claim.