G. v. New York City Department of Education

Background

L.G. is a sixteen-year-old child classified as having an emotional disturbance and receiving special education services from the New York City Department of Education (DOE). Because L.G. is a minor, the case was brought by L.G. through L.G.’s mother and legal guardian, N.G. Plaintiffs sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which requires participating states to provide disabled children with a free appropriate public education and an individualized education program (IEP).

L.G.’s June 15, 2023 IEP called for a 12-month placement in a residential non-public school. The parties did not dispute that recommendation. DOE referred L.G. to thirteen residential schools for the 2023–2024 school year. Two had no openings, nine declined to serve L.G. because they could not meet L.G.’s needs, and N.G. was not contacted by the remaining two schools. DOE offered Forest Hills High School as an interim placement while it continued seeking a residential placement. The court found that Forest Hills was not residential and therefore did not satisfy L.G.’s IEP. N.G. then enrolled L.G. at Crossroads Academy RTC and sought an order requiring DOE to fund that placement.

Issue and legal standards

Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction under two IDEA provisions. First, they argued that Crossroads was L.G.’s placement under the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision, which generally requires a child to remain in the current educational placement at public expense while an education dispute is pending. Alternatively, they asked the court to use its equitable authority under the IDEA to require DOE to fund Crossroads.

The court applied the same standard to both forms of emergency relief. Plaintiffs had to show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without an injunction, that the balance of hardships favored them, and that the injunction would serve the public interest.

The court first considered DOE’s argument that Plaintiffs had not exhausted available administrative remedies. It concluded that the exhaustion requirement did not bar the case because Plaintiffs alleged a violation of the stay-put provision, an allegation sufficient to invoke an exception to that requirement. The court therefore found that it had authority to consider the request for emergency relief.

Court’s reasoning

The court distinguished this case from Second Circuit precedent involving parents who unilaterally moved children from an agreed-upon school to another school because they preferred the new school. Here, the residential placements were unavailable, and DOE’s proposed interim placement was not equivalent to the residential program required by L.G.’s IEP. The court determined that these circumstances fit the category of extraordinary cases in which equitable relief may be available.

The court found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed because no available residential program could serve as L.G.’s placement and DOE had not proposed an equivalent alternative. It also found likely irreparable harm because N.G. could no longer afford the Crossroads tuition, and Crossroads had agreed to keep L.G. enrolled only through November 3, 2023, absent DOE funding or an injunction.

Finally, the court found that the balance of hardships favored Plaintiffs and that an injunction served the public interest. DOE had not provided a placement satisfying L.G.’s IEP or indicated when it would provide one.

Disposition

Judge Oetken granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The order requires DOE to fund L.G.’s placement at Crossroads Academy RTC monthly during the pendency of the due process proceedings. The parties were directed to file a joint status letter by December 29, 2023, and the clerk was directed to close the motions at ECF Nos. 6 and 14.