Cheng v. Garland

Background

Sheng-Wen Cheng pleaded guilty in an earlier criminal proceeding to major fraud against the United States, bank fraud, securities fraud, and wire fraud. Former District Judge Alison J. Nathan sentenced him to 72 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. The sentencing order also directed that Cheng be removed from the United States to the Republic of China (Taiwan) after he completed his prison term.

While incarcerated and proceeding without a lawyer, Cheng sued Attorney General Merrick Garland in his official capacity. Cheng sought a writ of mandamus—a court order requiring a federal official to perform a specific legal duty. He asked the court to require the Government to immediately begin proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a) and apply his good-time credits, which he said would provide for early release and removal.

Legal standard

The Government moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court explained that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the plaintiff shows a clear right to the requested relief, a plainly defined and mandatory duty for the Government to perform, and no other adequate remedy.

Court’s reasoning

The court concluded that Cheng could not satisfy this standard. First, it held that he had no clear right to require the initiation of removal proceedings under Section 1228(a), because the statute says it does not create an enforceable substantive or procedural right or benefit against the United States, its agencies, or its officers. Second, the court held that the statute did not impose a mandatory duty on the Attorney General to begin those proceedings before Cheng’s release from the institution where he was confined.

The court noted that the parties disputed whether Cheng had another available remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a statute used to challenge certain federal custody matters. The court did not decide that issue because it found other grounds requiring denial of mandamus. It noted that such a petition challenging physical custody would have to be filed in the district where Cheng was confined and name his warden as the respondent.

Motion to strike

Cheng also moved to strike the Government’s reply because it argued for the first time that he had not pursued administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons. The court did not decide whether to consider that argument. Because the court denied mandamus on other grounds, it denied Cheng’s motion to strike as moot.

Disposition

Judge Vernon S. Broderick granted the Government’s motion to dismiss and denied Cheng’s motion to strike as moot. The Clerk was directed to terminate the two pending motions and close the case.