Cheng v. United States

Background

Sheng-Wen Cheng sued the United States while incarcerated and representing himself. He challenged the Bureau of Prisons policy applying 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i), which makes a federal prisoner subject to a final removal order ineligible to apply First Step Act time credits toward prerelease custody or supervised release. Cheng asserted claims under the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act. He also challenged a separate policy concerning immigration detainers.

Cheng had pleaded guilty to major fraud against the United States, bank fraud, securities fraud, and wire fraud. Former District Judge Alison J. Nathan sentenced him to 72 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release and ordered his removal to the Republic of China (Taiwan) after his imprisonment.

Motion to dismiss

The Government moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s authority to hear a case, while Rule 12(b)(6) concerns whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court granted the motion.

Equal protection

Cheng pursued equal-protection theories based on selective enforcement and a “class of one.” The court held that the amended complaint did not plausibly allege that Cheng was treated differently from a similarly situated person. It also held that Cheng did not plausibly allege an impermissible reason for the difference or show that the policy lacked a rational basis.

The court concluded that preventing people facing removal from applying time credits toward early release could rationally serve the goals of reducing flight risk, facilitating deportation, punishing serious offenses, protecting society, and deterring future crimes. It granted the Government’s motion to dismiss Count I and dismissed that claim.

Due process

The court held that Cheng had not identified a protected liberty interest. Under the First Step Act, a prisoner subject to a final removal order is ineligible to apply the relevant time credits. Because Cheng had no legitimate entitlement to apply those credits, the court concluded that he had not shown a deprivation protected by the Fifth Amendment. It granted the Government’s motion to dismiss Count II and dismissed the claim.

Administrative Procedure Act

The court held that Cheng had not exhausted the Bureau of Prisons’ required grievance process. Cheng alleged that a counselor ignored his initial grievance and refused to provide additional grievance forms, but he did not describe further reasonable efforts to pursue the grievance process.

The court also addressed the merits of the Administrative Procedure Act claim. Assuming that the challenged policy qualified as final agency action, the court held that Cheng had not alleged unlawful agency action separate from what the First Step Act itself requires. It granted the Government’s motion to dismiss Count VII and dismissed that claim.

Federal Tort Claims Act

The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the United States’ immunity for certain tort claims but requires a claimant to present the claim to the appropriate federal agency before filing suit. Cheng said he filed the required administrative tort claim on May 3, 2023, but he had filed this lawsuit on December 12, 2022. Because the administrative filing came after the lawsuit began, the court held that it did not establish the required exhaustion or give the court authority to hear the claims.

The court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss Counts III, IV, V, and VI and dismissed those claims without prejudice.

Other claims and motions

Cheng conceded that he lacked standing to challenge the Bureau of Prisons’ separate immigration-detainer policy and that those claims were moot. The court therefore dismissed those claims.

The court denied Cheng’s motion for a preliminary injunction because he could not show a likelihood of success on his claims. It denied as moot his motion for judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, summary judgment, and his motion for appointment of counsel. The court directed the Clerk to terminate the listed motions and close the case.