Adeghe v. The Procter & Gamble Company

Background

Aja Adeghe sued The Procter & Gamble Company over the labeling of Tide 2.72-liter liquid detergent. The front label stated that the bottle contained enough detergent for “64 loads,” followed by a diamond symbol. Adeghe alleged that consumers would understand “loads” to mean full laundry loads, but that the bottle contained enough detergent for only 32 full loads. She alleged that the diamond and the related explanation on the back label were difficult to notice.

Adeghe asserted claims under Sections 349 and 350 of the New York General Business Law, unspecified consumer-fraud laws from eight other states, express and implied warranties, and unjust enrichment. She sought to represent proposed New York and multi-state purchaser classes. She withdrew her Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim in her opposition to the motion.

Motion-to-dismiss standard

The court considered the defendant’s motion under Rule 12(b)(6), which asks whether a complaint alleges enough facts to make a legally plausible claim. For this motion, the court accepted Adeghe’s factual allegations as true but did not accept legal conclusions as facts.

New York consumer-protection claims

The court dismissed Adeghe’s claims under New York General Business Law Sections 349 and 350. Those provisions address deceptive business practices and false advertising. The court explained that a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the challenged conduct was directed at consumers, materially misleading, and caused injury.

The court held that a reasonable consumer viewing the entire label would not interpret “64 loads” to mean 64 full or high-efficiency loads. In the court’s view, the word “load” is ambiguous because laundry loads can have different sizes. The diamond symbol and the back label supplied additional context, stating that the detergent was enough for approximately 64 medium loads when measured using the cap. The court concluded that this clarification defeated Adeghe’s theory that the front label was materially misleading.

The court also rejected Adeghe’s assertion that consumers necessarily understand “load” to mean a full unit in the same way that terms such as “meter” or “liter” have fixed meanings. The court characterized that assertion as an unsupported conclusion contradicted by other allegations recognizing different laundry-load sizes. Because the court found no material deception, it did not decide the parties’ remaining arguments about whether Adeghe adequately alleged injury.

Other state consumer-fraud claims

The court dismissed Adeghe’s claims under the “State Consumer Fraud Acts.” The complaint did not identify the specific laws involved or explain how P&G allegedly violated each one, which the court found insufficient under Rule 8’s requirement that a complaint give fair notice of the claims. The court also held that, even if the state laws had identical requirements, the claims failed for the same reason as the New York claims: the label would not mislead a reasonable consumer when read as a whole.

Warranty claims

The court dismissed the express-warranty claim because Adeghe did not adequately allege that she gave P&G timely notice of the claimed breach. The complaint stated only that she had recently become aware of the breach and had provided or was providing notice, without alleging facts such as when or how notice was given. The court rejected an argument that the notice requirement was eliminated for retail sales, explaining that the cited exception did not apply to an economic-loss claim involving laundry detergent.

The court also dismissed the implied-warranty claim. An implied warranty of merchantability generally requires that a product be fit for its ordinary use. The court found that the complaint alleged only that the detergent provided fewer full loads than Adeghe expected, not that it was unsafe, unusable, or otherwise unfit to be used as laundry detergent. To the extent the implied-warranty claim rested on the label’s alleged promise, the court said it failed for the same reasons as the express-warranty claim.

Unjust-enrichment claim

The court dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim because Adeghe alleged no facts unique to that claim and did not explain how it differed from her consumer-protection and warranty claims. The court treated the claim as duplicative of her other theories.

Leave to amend and disposition

Adeghe asked for permission to amend her complaint a second time. The court declined to grant leave to amend because most defects were substantive and could not be fixed through better pleading, she had already amended once after receiving notice of P&G’s intended arguments, and she had not identified additional facts that would cure the deficiencies.

Judge Cathy Seibel granted P&G’s motion to dismiss. The opinion does not add a “with prejudice” or “without prejudice” qualifier to that ruling. The court directed the clerk to terminate the motion and close the case.