Coritsidis v. Khal Bnei Torah of Mount Ivy

Background

John Coritsidis, Tina Coritsidis, and Kareen McKenzie live on Riverglen Drive in the Town of Haverstraw, New York. K’Hal Bnei Torah of Mount Ivy (KBT), which the opinion describes as a religious corporation serving the Town’s Orthodox Jewish community, owns a residence at 62 Riverglen Drive. KBT sought approval to convert and expand that residence into a house of worship. After the Town’s Planning Board rejected a proposed approval resolution, KBT sued the Town, the Planning Board, and three Board members. That earlier case settled, and the Town approved KBT’s application and agreed to pay KBT $235,000 in attorneys’ fees.

The plaintiffs then filed this case. Their amended complaint challenged the constitutionality of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that it discriminates in favor of religion and violates provisions of the United States Constitution. The amended complaint also asserted private- and public-nuisance claims against KBT based on alleged parking, pedestrian, noise, and safety problems connected to KBT’s existing and planned houses of worship.

Motions and Positions

KBT moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. KBT argued that the plaintiffs lacked constitutional standing, had not established a basis for federal jurisdiction, and had not plausibly alleged nuisance claims. KBT also requested attorneys’ fees and costs under New York’s anti-SLAPP law, a statute addressing lawsuits intended to interfere with public participation.

The United States separately moved to dismiss. It argued that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ federal claims because the United States had not waived its immunity from suit. It also argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing. In the alternative, the Government argued that the plaintiffs had not shown that RLUIPA violated the First, Fifth, or Ninth Amendments.

The plaintiffs argued that their alleged injuries gave them standing and that an exception to sovereign immunity applied because they were challenging RLUIPA’s constitutionality and the Government’s alleged effort to enforce it. They also argued that the nuisance claims were part of the same case or controversy as the federal claims and that the court could therefore exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Analysis

The court held that the United States had not waived sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs relied on exceptions associated with Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., but the court explained that those exceptions apply when a plaintiff challenges action by a federal officer. The amended complaint did not allege that any federal officer had taken action under RLUIPA or related authority.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that the United States had intervened to enforce RLUIPA. The court found that the Government had not taken a position in the case before being named as a defendant and had not attempted to enforce RLUIPA against the plaintiffs. The court noted that RLUIPA permits a person to assert a violation as a claim or defense and obtain relief against a government, and that the statute does not permit enforcement against private individuals who are not acting under state authority or under color of state law.

Because the plaintiffs failed to establish a waiver or exception to sovereign immunity, the court dismissed all claims against the United States without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The court therefore did not decide the parties’ standing arguments, although it stated that it would likely agree with the defendants that the plaintiffs lacked standing if it reached that issue. The court also did not decide whether the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law nuisance claims against KBT because all federal claims had been dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It dismissed those claims without prejudice for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. The court also noted that diversity jurisdiction was unavailable because the plaintiffs and KBT were citizens of New York.

Finally, the court denied KBT’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs under New York’s anti-SLAPP law. It relied on decisions from courts within the circuit concluding that the state law does not apply in federal court because its standards conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states that the defendants’ motions to dismiss were granted. More specifically, all claims against the United States were dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the state-law nuisance claims against KBT were dismissed without prejudice for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. KBT’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs under New York’s anti-SLAPP law was denied. The court directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the pending motions and close the case.