Jones v. N.Y.P.D.

Background

Matthew Jones, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the New York City Police Department and the Monticello Village Police Department. He alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights and asserted state-law claims for negligence and assault and battery. The complaint sought $10,000,000 in damages.

Jones alleged that he was two years old in 1988 when family members and various police officers sexually assaulted and beat him at several locations. He alleged that New York City police officers participated in or failed to stop some of the conduct, and that Monticello Village police officers assaulted him. Jones filed the complaint on October 25, 2023.

Court’s analysis

The court treated Jones’s constitutional claims as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for violations of constitutional rights by people acting under state authority. The court understood his negligence and assault-and-battery claims as state-law claims based on the court’s authority over disputes between citizens of different states.

The court concluded that the claims appeared to be barred by statutes of limitations. Under the applicable rules discussed by the court, § 1983 claims and negligence claims generally had three-year deadlines, while assault-and-battery claims had a one-year deadline. Because the alleged events occurred in 1988 and the complaint was filed about 35 years later, the court found the claims untimely.

The court considered whether the deadlines could be paused through equitable tolling, which allows narrow exceptions when applying the deadline would be unfair, or under New York rules concerning disability or infancy. It found that Jones had not alleged facts supporting equitable tolling. The court also stated that even if Jones’s infancy had paused the deadline until he reached adulthood, the claims would still have been untimely. The court determined that New York’s Adult Survivors Act did not apply because Jones did not allege that he was an adult when the alleged abuse occurred.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires screening and dismissal of certain complaints filed without prepayment of fees. The court granted Jones 30 days’ leave to replead by filing an amended complaint showing that his claims were timely or that equitable tolling should apply. The court stated that if Jones did not amend within that period, the Clerk would be directed to enter judgment.

The court certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Jones fee-waiver status for purposes of an appeal. It directed the Clerk to keep the matter open until a civil judgment was entered.