Trieu v. Extra Place Associates, LP

Background

Dat Tan Trieu proceeded without a lawyer and sued Extra Place Associates, LP, his landlord; members of his wife’s family; the law firm and attorneys representing Extra Place; the managing agent of his building; and Judge Frances S. Ortiz of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Housing Part. The dispute concerned Trieu’s tenancy in a Manhattan apartment and his eviction after a Housing Court proceeding.

Trieu alleged that the defendants had caused various harms, including wrongful taking of his property and severe emotional distress. He invoked Article 121 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a federal law concerning certain offenses by members of the armed forces. The court had previously allowed him to proceed without paying filing fees. The complaint and other filings also disclosed identifying information about Trieu’s minor children and his Social Security number. The court restricted electronic access to those filings and directed Trieu to follow the federal rule requiring redaction of sensitive information in future filings.

Court’s Analysis

The court first held that Article 121 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice did not apply. That law concerns military offenses, and Trieu did not allege that his claims arose from military-related matters.

The court then applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine prevents federal district courts from reviewing final state-court judgments in cases that are effectively appeals from those judgments. The court identified the relevant requirements as follows: the plaintiff lost in state court; the claimed injuries were caused by the state-court judgment; the plaintiff asked the federal court to review and reject that judgment; and the state-court judgment came before the federal case began.

The court found that Trieu lost the Housing Court eviction proceeding, in which Judge Ortiz allowed Trinh Ngo to remain a leaseholder and issued an eviction warrant against Trieu. Trieu’s federal claims sought damages connected to the termination of his lease and eviction and would require the federal court to reject or overturn the Housing Court’s decision. The court therefore concluded that all of Trieu’s claims concerning the lease and eviction were barred for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court declined to allow an amended complaint because it found that amendment could not cure the defects. It terminated all other pending matters and directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment.

The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Trieu permission to proceed without paying fees for an appeal. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.