Smith v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Background

Arthur Edward Smith filed this action without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He alleged that a Chase employee in Florida refused to cash his $873.64 paycheck and that, after he deposited the check online, Chase placed a 10-day hold on it. He claimed these actions were based on his race. He also alleged that a customer service representative, whom he said was in New York, did not assist him and ended a call after Smith spoke to the representative in a “lambasting and perhaps derogatory manner.”

Smith’s original complaint did not identify his race or provide facts showing that race was a motivating or necessary cause of the alleged conduct. The court gave him permission to amend. After Smith voluntarily dismissed the original complaint and later asked to reopen the matter, he filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint asserted race-discrimination and retaliation claims under Section 1981, a claim under “42 U.S.C. § 2000,” which the court construed as a claim under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He sought $250,000 in damages.

Federal discrimination and retaliation claims

The court explained that a Section 1981 race-discrimination claim requires facts showing that the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority, that the defendant intended to discriminate because of race, and that the discrimination affected an activity protected by the statute. The plaintiff must also allege that the protected activity would not have been denied but for race. Title II prohibits racial discrimination in public accommodations.

The court found that Smith’s amended complaint still contained no facts supporting the assertion that Chase or its employees discriminated or retaliated against him because of his race. Smith’s race remained unspecified, and the complaint did not show that race was a motivating factor or that the events would not have occurred but for race. The court therefore dismissed the federal discrimination and retaliation claims for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

Jurisdiction and emotional-distress claim

The court stated that it was not clear whether diversity jurisdiction existed. Smith alleged that he resided in Florida and sued Chase at a New York address, while the court explained that Chase is treated as a citizen of Ohio for diversity purposes. Smith also listed a New York address for the customer service representative but did not make clear where that person resided. Although Smith requested $250,000, he provided no facts explaining why he was entitled to that amount.

The court nevertheless addressed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. Under New York law, that claim requires extreme and outrageous conduct, an intent to cause severe emotional distress, a causal connection, and severe emotional distress. The court concluded that refusing to cash the paycheck, placing a hold on it, and providing unhelpful customer service did not amount to conduct beyond all possible bounds of decency. The allegations of mental anguish therefore did not support a viable claim.

Leave to amend and disposition

Because Smith had already been given an opportunity to amend and better pleading would not cure the defects, the court declined to allow him to file a second amended complaint. The court also noted that Smith had filed a substantially similar complaint arising from the same events in a prior related proceeding, where the court dismissed his claims for failure to state a claim and gave him an opportunity to amend.

Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed Smith’s amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of a fee-free complaint that fails to state a claim. The court terminated all pending matters and directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment. It certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Smith fee-free status for purposes of an appeal. The opinion does not specify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.