Justin v. Tingling
- Naomi Buchwald
- 1:22-cv-10370
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 19
In Justin v. Tingling, Judge Buchwald granted the standing challenge to the Sixth Amendment claim, denied it for the Fourteenth Amendment claim, and allowed a later dismissal motion.
Daudi Justin and the Community Service Society of New York: their Sixth Amendment claim could not proceed for lack of standing, while Justin’s Fourteenth Amendment claim remained pending subject to a possible motion to dismiss.
What happened
In Justin v. Tingling, Daudi Justin and the Community Service Society of New York challenged New York’s rule disqualifying people with felony convictions from jury service in New York County. They claimed the rule violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their Sixth Amendment claim because that amendment protects criminal defendants, not people seeking to serve as jurors. The court found that Justin had standing to bring the Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging racial discrimination, but it did not decide whether that claim would succeed.
Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald granted the defendant’s motion as to the Sixth Amendment claim, denied it as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, and granted the defendant permission to file a motion to dismiss that claim for failure to state a claim.
The detailed version
- Justin v. Tingling · No. 1:22-cv-10370
- Naomi Buchwald
- Jan. 23, 2024
Background
Daudi Justin and the Community Service Society of New York brought a proposed class action against Milton Adair Tingling in his official capacity as County Clerk of New York County and Commissioner of Jurors. The plaintiffs challenged Section 510(3) of New York’s Judiciary Law, which disqualifies people convicted of felonies from serving on juries. They sought a declaration that the rule was unconstitutional and an injunction barring its enforcement in New York County.
Justin alleged that he had received jury questionnaires twice and was required to disclose his felony conviction, which disqualified him from jury service. The complaint alleged that the rule disproportionately excluded Black people from the Manhattan jury pool. CSS alleged that it supports people with past convictions and provides information about jury eligibility.
Before addressing the plaintiffs’ request to pursue class certification, the court required briefing on standing. Standing is the requirement that a plaintiff show a concrete injury, a connection between that injury and the challenged conduct, and a remedy the court can provide.
Sixth Amendment claim
The court held that neither Justin nor CSS had standing to pursue the Sixth Amendment claim. The court explained that the Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial jury applies to “the accused,” meaning criminal defendants. Justin was not a criminal defendant, so his exclusion from jury service was not an injury to a legally protected Sixth Amendment interest. CSS likewise did not allege that it was, or would represent, criminal defendants entitled to Sixth Amendment protections.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they could assert criminal defendants’ rights as third parties. Among other requirements, third-party standing requires an injury to the plaintiff and a significant obstacle preventing the rights-holder from protecting their own interests. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked the required injury and that criminal defendants could bring their own challenges to jury representation.
Fourteenth Amendment claim
The plaintiffs also claimed that the jury-service rule, as applied in New York County, violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because of racial discrimination. For purposes of deciding standing, the court accepted the plaintiffs’ allegations that the disqualification was race-based. It concluded that Justin had suffered an injury in fact because he was excluded from jury service and allegedly suffered related reputational harm.
Because Justin had standing, the court did not require CSS to independently establish standing for the same claim. The court did not decide the merits of the Fourteenth Amendment claim. It noted that the defendant had presented strong arguments that the claim would fail under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legal claim.
Disposition
The court granted the defendant’s motion as to the plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claim because they lacked standing. It denied the defendant’s motion as to the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim because Justin had standing. The court granted the defendant’s request for leave to file a separate Rule 12(b)(6) motion addressing whether the Fourteenth Amendment claim adequately states a claim. The court set deadlines for that motion and the plaintiffs’ response. The opinion did not address class certification.
Read the full 19-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.