Rivera v. PLS Check Cashers of New York, Inc.

Background

Jennifer Rivera sued PLS Check Cashers of New York, Inc. (PLS) and Katherine Guzman. She asserted discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She also asserted a Wage Theft Prevention Act claim against the defendants and aiding-and-abetting discrimination claims against Guzman under the New York laws.

PLS required customer-service-representative applicants to score at least 50 on a pre-employment assessment. Rivera scored 36. Guzman selected Rivera for an interview without checking the score, and Rivera was hired after an interview, background check, drug test, and orientation. After PLS human-resources employee Sam Alcala reviewed Rivera’s new-hire paperwork, he discovered the failing score and directed that her employment be terminated. The opinion states that Alcala did not know Rivera was pregnant and had not spoken with Guzman or the other manager involved in Rivera’s hiring.

Rivera had disclosed her pregnancy to Marielis Sierra and later spoke with Guzman about it. Rivera claimed that both made negative or inappropriate comments about her pregnancy and that Guzman told her she should have disclosed it during the interview. Guzman disputed Rivera’s account of their conversation. Rivera was terminated shortly after these events, but the parties disputed what Guzman said when communicating the termination.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the summary-judgment standard, under which judgment may be entered without a trial when no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result exists and the moving party is legally entitled to judgment.

For the Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law discrimination claims, the court held that Rivera had not shown circumstances supporting an inference that pregnancy discrimination caused her termination. The court emphasized that Alcala made the termination decision based on the assessment score, did not know Rivera was pregnant, and did not consult anyone else. The court also held that, even assuming Rivera initially met her burden, she had not shown that PLS’s stated reason—her score of 36—was a pretext, meaning a false reason masking discrimination. The court therefore granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these claims.

The court separately evaluated Rivera’s New York City Human Rights Law discrimination claim under that law’s broader standard. It held that Rivera had not shown that she was treated less favorably, or that discrimination played any role in the termination. The court noted that another candidate with a disqualifying score was also terminated after the score was discovered. It granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the New York City claim.

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Rivera’s retaliation claims because Rivera stated that she was no longer pursuing them and did not oppose the motion. It also held that Guzman’s aiding-and-abetting claims failed because Rivera had not established a primary discrimination or retaliation claim.

For the Wage Theft Prevention Act claim, the court held that Rivera needed to show a concrete injury resulting from the failure to provide required wage information. The court found no evidence that the missing information caused her harm. It also noted that Rivera did not claim that she was paid less than the wages required by New York law. The court dismissed the Wage Theft Prevention Act claim without prejudice for lack of standing.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Rivera’s claims under Title VII, the New York City Human Rights Law, and the New York State Human Rights Law. The court dismissed Rivera’s Wage Theft Prevention Act claims without prejudice for lack of standing. It directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion and close the case.

Judge

The opinion was issued and signed by Arun Subramanian, United States District Judge.