Delgado v. Donald J. Trump For President, Inc.

Background

Arlene Delgado sued Donald J. Trump For President, Inc., Trump for America, Inc., Sean Spicer, Reince Priebus, and Stephen Bannon. She alleged that after telling the Campaign about her pregnancy, she faced pregnancy discrimination and retaliation. She also asserted common-law claims, including breach of contract and interference with anticipated employment at the White House.

The opinion addressed only Delgado’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455 asking Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker to recuse herself, meaning to step aside because her impartiality could reasonably be questioned. The opinion states that Judge Parker was assigned to general pretrial management, not to decide the merits of the case.

Delgado’s Arguments

Delgado argued that Judge Parker was biased because, before becoming a judge, she had represented defendants in employment matters. Delgado also pointed to the court’s handling of discovery deadlines, the withdrawal of three attorneys who had represented her, and events surrounding a confidential settlement conference.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that a judge is presumed impartial and that the person seeking recusal must overcome that presumption. Recusal is required when a judge has personal bias or when an objective, fully informed observer would have significant reason to doubt that the case would be decided fairly. Opinions and rulings arising from the case generally do not establish disqualifying bias unless they show such deep favoritism or hostility that fair judgment would be impossible.

The court found no allegation or evidence of bias from outside the case and expressly denied having such bias. It rejected the argument that Judge Parker’s prior work as an employment lawyer required recusal, reasoning that such a rule would require judges to step aside from cases involving their former practice areas.

The court also rejected Delgado’s challenge to discovery management. It reviewed the case history and stated that it had repeatedly extended discovery deadlines, including extensions granted after objections from the defendants. The court concluded that not granting every requested extension was not evidence of bias, particularly because its rulings were not merits decisions.

The court found that the withdrawal of Delgado’s three attorneys followed asserted breakdowns in the attorney-client relationships and that the applicable standard for withdrawal had been met. It also rejected Delgado’s argument that her status as a single mother made it improper for her to proceed without a lawyer. The court noted that Delgado had attended Harvard Law School and had practiced as an attorney, although not as a litigator.

Finally, the court concluded that the settlement-conference events did not support recusal. The court had originally ordered in-person attendance, later allowed Delgado to participate virtually after her counsel reported childcare responsibilities, and stated that a court may sanction a party for violating a court order. It found that Delgado’s other accusations and descriptions of the judge’s demeanor also did not establish grounds for recusal.

Disposition

The court denied Delgado’s motion for recusal and directed the clerk to terminate the motion at ECF No. 184. The opinion did not decide the underlying discrimination, retaliation, contract, or tort claims.