Tieu v. New York City Economic Development Corporation

Background

Lia Tieu was hired as a vice president in asset management at the New York City Economic Development Corporation (EDC) in July 2018. She alleged that EDC, Winthrop Hoyt, and Rachel Loeb discriminated against her based on sex, race, pregnancy, and disability, interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and retaliated against her protected activities. Her claims arose under the FMLA, Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Tieu became pregnant in 2019 and requested changes to her work schedule and location. EDC denied an initial request to work from home for two days per week but approved reduced office hours. After Tieu experienced hearing loss and provided a doctor’s note, EDC later approved a period of working from home and credited back two sick or vacation days. EDC also approved her parental leave, later approved additional medical-leave extensions, allowed her to return on a reduced schedule, and granted exemptions from returning to the office.

Tieu received performance reviews in 2019 and 2021 that criticized aspects of her communication. She received a smaller raise after the first review and was ineligible for a bonus after the second review. After returning from leave on a three-day-per-week schedule, she claimed that most of her projects had been removed, that she had no direct reports, and that she was subjected to increased supervision. She also made internal complaints alleging discrimination and retaliation. EDC investigations concluded that her complaints could not be substantiated.

Summary-judgment standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Tieu, while requiring her to present concrete evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in her favor.

Federal discrimination claims

For the Title VII, Section 1981, and ADA discrimination claims, the court applied the burden-shifting framework commonly used in employment-discrimination cases. Under that framework, a plaintiff first presents evidence supporting an initial inference of discrimination. The employer then gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, after which the plaintiff must show that reason was a pretext—a cover for unlawful discrimination.

The court held that Tieu’s smaller raise, denial of a one-time bonus, and alleged reduction in responsibilities could qualify as materially adverse employment actions. It also held that the timing of the events and Hoyt’s alleged statements that she was “shirking” her responsibilities and should take “ownership” of her work were barely enough to support an initial inference of pregnancy discrimination. But the court found no sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent based on race or non-pregnancy gender. Tieu had not heard Hoyt or Loeb make derogatory comments about Asians, women, or pregnant women, and the court found that her evidence about other Asian women’s experiences did not establish the required connection to her claims.

The court found that defendants offered legitimate reasons for the performance reviews: concerns about Tieu’s communication style supported by specific incidents. They also offered a legitimate reason for reducing her workload after her return: she was working three days per week rather than five. The court concluded that Tieu had not shown these reasons were pretextual. It therefore granted summary judgment on her Title VII claims and granted summary judgment on her Section 1981 claim for the same reasons.

As to the ADA, the court assumed, without deciding, that Tieu could establish an initial disability-discrimination case. It nevertheless granted summary judgment because she did not undermine defendants’ stated reasons for the performance reviews. The court also rejected her failure-to-accommodate theory. It found that EDC provided an effective reduced-hours accommodation for her morning sickness, approved work from home after receiving medical documentation for her hearing loss, and was not required to provide an accommodation for the deposition because Tieu did not request to be excused from it. The court held that EDC granted reasonable accommodations and granted summary judgment on the ADA claim.

FMLA interference

The court granted summary judgment on Tieu’s FMLA interference claim. Tieu argued that Hoyt interfered with her rights by initially refusing to sign her parental-leave form, discouraging her from taking leave, and failing to restore her to the same or an equivalent position.

The court found that Hoyt signed the form less than a week later after confirming Tieu’s leave eligibility, and Tieu presented no evidence that the delay harmed her or caused her to lose FMLA leave. The court also found that Hoyt’s alleged criticisms concerned Tieu’s work performance and delegation of an assignment, not an attempt to discourage her from taking FMLA leave. Finally, the court held that Tieu was not entitled to restoration under the FMLA because her twelve weeks of FMLA-covered leave had ended while she remained unable to return to work.

Retaliation claims

The court granted summary judgment on Tieu’s retaliation claims under the FMLA, Title VII, the ADA, and Section 1981. It accepted for purposes of the motion that Tieu engaged in protected activities, including requesting accommodations, taking FMLA leave, and making discrimination complaints, and that defendants knew about those activities.

The court treated the two performance reviews and the reduction in workload as potentially adverse employment actions for retaliation purposes. It found that other alleged actions—including assigning no direct reports, ignoring an email about benefits, requiring two-on-one meetings, requiring previously completed training, and failing to transfer her—did not meet the required level of harm or were not actionable on the record. Tieu had not formally applied for a transfer, as EDC policy required.

The court assumed that Tieu had shown a sufficient initial causal connection based largely on timing. It nevertheless found that defendants offered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the performance reviews and workload reduction, and that Tieu did not produce enough evidence to show those reasons were a pretext for retaliation. The court rejected her reliance on Hoyt’s alleged “shirking” comment, a text message from Loeb, positive feedback from another employee, and alleged flaws in EDC’s internal investigations.

State-law claims and disposition

After granting summary judgment on all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Tieu’s claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court dismissed those state-law claims without prejudice to renewal in state court.

Judge Analisa Torres granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, directed the Clerk to enter judgment consistent with the order, and closed the case.