Mamyrova v. Neighborhood Association for Inter-Cultural Affairs, Inc.

Background

Nazik-Ayla Mamyrova alleged that Neighborhood Association for Inter-Cultural Affairs, Inc. (NAICA), along with employees Tamika Brown and Isha Smith, discriminated against her while she stayed at a NAICA shelter from November 2018 through May 2019. Among other allegations, Mamyrova said Brown refused to give her a pass to remain out past curfew to attend religious services, told her to return to Kyrgyzstan, and that NAICA staff taunted her as “Russian-Asian.” She also alleged mistreatment involving her medical conditions and advice about New York City’s housing-voucher program.

Mamyrova’s complaint cited 31 U.S.C. § 6711 and Chapter 21 of Title 42. She requested $1 million in damages and an order requiring Brown and other case workers to undergo diversity, religious, and racial-equality training. She initially proceeded without a lawyer but later obtained pro bono counsel for settlement discussions, discovery, and opposition to summary judgment.

Summary-judgment standard

The court explained that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the opposing party would bear the burden of proof at trial, that party must identify evidence supporting the essential elements of the claim.

31 U.S.C. § 6711 claim

The court held that the record did not show that NAICA, or another relevant unit of local government, received payments under Title 31, as required for a claim under § 6711. The court therefore found that Mamyrova had not presented a legally supportable claim under that provision.

The court also identified failure to exhaust administrative remedies as an independent reason the claim failed. Under the cited statutes, a plaintiff must file a complaint with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development before bringing a § 6711 claim. Defendants represented that Mamyrova had not filed such a complaint, and Mamyrova did not claim or provide evidence that she had.

Claims under Chapter 21 of Title 42

Mamyrova did not identify the specific provision in Chapter 21 that she was invoking. The defendants proposed several possible theories, and she did not dispute those descriptions in her opposition.

First, the court considered a possible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which protects equal rights to make and enforce contracts. The court found that Mamyrova had not identified, or provided evidence of, any contractual rights that discrimination had impaired.

Second, the court considered a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits claims for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law. The court found no evidence that NAICA or its employees exercised state power or were state actors. The court explained that NAICA’s status as a private nonprofit corporation, its receipt of public money, and its compliance with local-government regulations were not enough by themselves to establish state action. Mamyrova also had not shown that the government was sufficiently intertwined with NAICA’s challenged conduct or that NAICA exercised powers reserved exclusively to the state.

Third, the court considered a possible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, which prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation. The court explained that this provision permits only injunctive relief, not damages. It further found that Mamyrova lacked standing to seek an injunction because she was no longer staying at a NAICA shelter, had not done so for several years, and had not shown a real and immediate threat of returning to the alleged conditions. The court also noted that Brown no longer worked for NAICA and that other shelters were available.

Procedural objections

Mamyrova’s opposition focused mainly on alleged defects in defendants’ summary-judgment papers, including statements she said were absent from the required factual statement, lacked record citations, or mischaracterized evidence. The court rejected her request for summary denial of the motion. It held that any such procedural defects did not justify disregarding the substance of the motion, particularly because her claims failed for lack of evidence supporting essential elements.

Disposition

Judge Arun Subramanian granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Clerk of Court was directed to enter judgment for the defendants and close the case.