Lovett v. Bennett

Background

Steven J. Lovett, a state inmate proceeding without a lawyer, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows claims against state actors for violating constitutional rights. He sued Acting Superintendent Susie Bennett, Correction Officers Shane Topel, Kevin Darling, and Felix Santos, and Classification Analyst Jaclyn Chafetz.

Lovett alleged that he was present at Sullivan Correctional Facility during a 2015 incident involving the death of another incarcerated person. He later testified in 2019 in a wrongful-death lawsuit involving that incident. In March 2022, after that lawsuit ended, he was transferred back to Sullivan, where some of the correction officers against whom he testified still worked. Lovett alleged that Chafetz knowingly made the transfer despite the danger, that he was extorted, and that correction officers directed other inmates to threaten him and throw burnt cigarette butts into his cell. He also alleged emotional and mental injuries, but acknowledged that he suffered no physical injury at Sullivan.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). The court treated the defendants’ jurisdiction argument under Rule 12(b)(1) as part of their argument that the complaint failed to state a viable claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Claims Against Topel, Darling, Santos, and Bennett

The court held that Lovett failed to allege the personal involvement required for a § 1983 claim. A defendant’s supervisory position or place in the prison chain of command is not enough; the complaint must connect that defendant’s own actions to the alleged injury.

Lovett did not mention Topel, Darling, or Santos in the factual statement of his complaint. He mentioned Bennett only in alleging that he wrote to her about his grievances and was denied a mental-health consultation. The court found those allegations ambiguous and insufficient to connect Bennett to a constitutional violation or injury. The court therefore dismissed all claims against Topel, Darling, Santos, and Bennett for lack of personal involvement.

Eighth Amendment Claim Against Chafetz

The court interpreted Lovett’s allegations against Chafetz as an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. Such a claim requires facts showing both a substantial risk of serious harm and that the official knew about and disregarded that risk.

The court found Lovett’s allegations too general and speculative. He did not allege that the correction officers against whom he testified actually threatened or harmed him. The alleged cigarette-butt incident involved unidentified inmates, and Lovett did not provide particular facts showing an actual threat or harm. He also did not identify a specific instance in which he was threatened or harmed or allege actual physical injury. The court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim against Chafetz.

First Amendment Retaliation Claim Against Chafetz

The court also interpreted the complaint as asserting First Amendment retaliation. It accepted that Lovett’s testimony in the earlier lawsuit was protected speech. It further concluded that a transfer motivated solely by an intent to endanger an inmate could qualify as an adverse action.

The court nevertheless found that Lovett did not plausibly allege a causal connection between his testimony and the transfer. He did not allege that Chafetz knew about the earlier lawsuit or knew that he had testified. The court also found that the more-than-two-year gap suggested by the allegations between the testimony and the transfer weakened the inference of retaliation. Conclusory allegations of retaliatory intent were insufficient, so the court dismissed the First Amendment retaliation claim against Chafetz.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

Because Lovett had already received multiple opportunities to amend his complaint and still had not stated a plausible claim, the court denied further amendment as futile and dismissed all claims in the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.

Judge Nelson S. Roman granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 46 and terminate the action.