Wu v. Sushi Nomado of Manhattan, Inc.

Background

Fen Biao Cai brought claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law (NYLL), including claims that he was denied minimum wages and overtime pay. Jian Wu was also named in the caption, but the opinion states that Wu later dismissed his claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). The action was tried to a jury solely on Cai’s claims.

The trial involved Cai’s claims against Sushi Para 33 Corporation, Sushi Para Manhattan Corp., Wenwu Chen, Zhou Lin, Sheng R. Dong, and Ding Feng Zhang. The opinion states that Sushi Nomado of Manhattan, Inc. and Wei Loong Chan had not appeared in the action and that briefing was ongoing on Cai’s motions for default judgments against them.

Motions at the Close of Cai’s Case

At the close of Cai’s evidence, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a). The court stated that it denied the motions by Zhou Lin and Ding Feng Zhang, reserved judgment on the motions by Sushi Para Manhattan Corp. and Sushi Para 33 Corporation, and granted the motions by Wenwu Chen and Sheng R. Dong. This order memorialized the decision to grant Chen’s and Dong’s mid-trial motions.

Rule 50(a) permits judgment as a matter of law before a case is submitted to the jury when a reasonable jury would lack a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the opposing party. In applying that standard, the court must draw reasonable inferences for the nonmoving party and defer to credibility determinations; it may not weigh witness credibility or the evidence itself. Judgment is appropriate when the evidence supporting the opposing party is completely absent or when the evidence for the moving party is so overwhelming that reasonable jurors could not find otherwise.

Employer Status Under the FLSA and NYLL

The court explained that a defendant generally must be the plaintiff’s “employer” to be liable under the FLSA or NYLL. Employer status depends on the economic realities of the relationship, including possible formal control—such as the power to hire and fire, control over schedules or working conditions, control over pay, and maintenance of employment records—and functional control over the worker’s job. The analysis is flexible and considers the totality of the circumstances.

For Wenwu Chen, Cai introduced only a stipulation that Chen was one of the owners of Sushi Para 33 Corporation. For Sheng R. Dong, Cai introduced only a stipulation that Dong was an officer of Sushi Para Manhattan Corp. and its New York Division Alcoholic Beverage Control Principle. Cai offered no other exhibits or testimony referring to either defendant.

The court relied on Second Circuit precedent holding that ownership or officer status, without evidence of control over employment-related operations, is insufficient to establish individual employer status. The court found no evidence that Chen or Dong was individually involved in workplace conditions, operations, personnel, or compensation. It therefore concluded that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find that either defendant was Cai’s employer under the FLSA or NYLL.

Disposition

The court granted Wenwu Chen’s and Sheng R. Dong’s mid-trial Rule 50(a) motions. All claims against those defendants were dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court was directed to enter judgment in their favor. The order did not decide the reserved motions by Sushi Para Manhattan Corp. and Sushi Para 33 Corporation and did not change the court’s denial of the motions by Zhou Lin and Ding Feng Zhang.