Philbert v. New York City Department Of Education
- Rochon
- 1:21-cv-03119
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 15
In Philbert v. New York City Department of Education, Judge Rochon granted summary judgment to the Department on Philbert’s disability-retaliation claim.
Shakema Philbert’s remaining ADA retaliation claim against the New York City Department of Education was resolved in the Department’s favor; the court directed that the case be closed.
What happened
Philbert v. New York City Department of Education concerned Shakema Philbert’s claim that the Department retaliated against her for requesting air-conditioning access because heat triggered her migraines. The Department ended her probationary employment shortly afterward.
The court considered whether Philbert had shown that her migraines were a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act or that the Department regarded her as disabled. It concluded that the evidence showed, at most, that migraines prevented her from working in one particular classroom without consistent air conditioning, while her general statements about other effects were too vague.
Judge Jennifer L. Rochon granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that no reasonable jury could find that Philbert was disabled or regarded as disabled under the Act. The court did not address the Department’s alternative argument about its reason for ending her employment and directed the Clerk to close the case.
The detailed version
- Philbert v. New York City Department Of Education · No. 1:21-cv-03119
- Rochon
- Feb. 23, 2024
Background
Shakema Philbert worked for the New York City Department of Education as a special-education teacher from 2011 to 2019. She experienced migraines and had surgery in 2015. During the 2018–2019 school year, she told Principal Kerianne Harrison that she needed access to the air conditioner in her classroom because heat triggered her migraines. Philbert and a paraprofessional in the classroom had ongoing disputes about the air conditioner. The school custodian disconnected it on June 17, 2019, and Philbert later asked Harrison to have it turned back on.
By letter dated June 24, 2019, the Department terminated Philbert’s probationary employment. The opinion states that the letter apparently was received later and presumes that the termination occurred on or after June 25, 2019.
Philbert originally asserted several claims against the Department and other defendants. After an earlier motion to dismiss, the only remaining claim was that the Department retaliated against her under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by terminating her employment because she requested a reasonable accommodation for her migraines. After discovery, the Department moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence presents a genuine dispute requiring a trial.
Legal standard
For an ADA retaliation claim, a plaintiff generally must show that she engaged in protected activity, the employer knew about that activity, the employer took an adverse action, and the protected activity caused the adverse action. A request for a reasonable accommodation may be protected activity. If the plaintiff makes that initial showing, the employer may offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its action, after which the plaintiff must show that reason was a pretext for retaliation.
The Department argued that Philbert could not establish that she was disabled under the ADA and that the Department had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating her employment. The court addressed the disability issue first.
Disability under the ADA
The ADA defines a disability to include an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, such as working, sleeping, reading, concentrating, or thinking. A person may also qualify if the employer regarded that person as having such an impairment.
The court held that Philbert did not provide enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that her migraines substantially limited a major life activity. The evidence showed that she could work as a teacher in classrooms with consistent air conditioning, in a different part of the building, in a cooler classroom, or in the same classroom without the particular paraprofessional. The court concluded that being unable to work in one particular classroom under certain conditions did not substantially limit the broader activity of working.
The court also held that Philbert’s surgery in 2015 and her diagnosis, without additional evidence about continuing substantial limitations, did not establish an ADA disability. Although Philbert declared that her migraines caused visual and speech impairments, difficulty hearing and sleeping, concentration problems, trouble reading, and other effects, the court found those statements too general and unsupported by details about their extent.
The court separately rejected Philbert’s argument that the Department regarded her as disabled. Evidence that supervisors knew she had migraines, knew she received treatment, expressed empathy, or offered support did not show that they perceived her as substantially limited in a major life activity.
Disposition
The court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment because Philbert was neither shown to have an ADA disability nor to have been regarded as disabled. Because that conclusion resolved the claim, the court did not analyze the Department’s alternative argument that it had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for ending Philbert’s employment. The court directed the Clerk to close the motion and close the case.
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.