Murphy v. City Of New York
- Analisa Torres
- 1:23-cv-01925
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 20
In Murphy v. City of New York, Judge Torres partly granted and partly denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss claims about COVID-19 policing.
Harvey Murphy may continue litigating some federal claims, including equal-protection and municipal-liability claims. Katyria Giler Colon’s claims were dismissed, subject to a possible motion to substitute a personal representative. The City of New York and the named officers must continue defending the claims that were not dismissed.
What happened
In Murphy v. City of New York, Harvey Murphy and Katyria Giler Colon sued New York City and police officers, alleging discriminatory enforcement of COVID-19 social-distancing policies against Black and Latinx communities, along with constitutional and state-law claims.
The court dismissed all of Colon’s claims and allowed plaintiffs to seek permission to substitute a personal representative for a deceased person’s claims. It dismissed Murphy’s requests for court orders requiring future changes, his New York constitutional claims, his standalone due-process claim, and several state-law claims. Other claims, including Murphy’s federal equal-protection and municipal-liability claims, were allowed to continue.
Judge Analisa Torres held that the complaint plausibly alleged race-based enforcement and City policies or failures that could support liability, while ruling that some claims were barred by filing deadlines or lacked the required basis to proceed.
The detailed version
- Murphy v. City Of New York · No. 1:23-cv-01925
- Analisa Torres
- Mar. 4, 2024
Background
Harvey Murphy and Katyria Giler Colon sued the City of New York and New York City Police Department officers Eric S. Dym, Shawn Moynihan, Victor Carrasquillo, and unidentified officers. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants discriminatorily enforced COVID-19 social-distancing policies against Black and Latinx communities. They asserted claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, analogous New York constitutional claims, and state common-law tort claims.
The complaint alleged that officers stopped Murphy and Levar Jones on April 9, 2020, took or damaged their phones, used pepper spray, and used physical force. Jones was arrested, taken to a police station and hospital, and later released. The criminal charges against Jones were ultimately dismissed. Jones later died from unrelated causes. Colon alleged that she and her minor children had been supported by Jones and expected future support from him.
Rule 12(b)(1) Issues
The defendants argued that Colon and her children were not the proper parties to assert Jones’s claims. The court explained that a Section 1983 claim generally belongs to the person whose rights were allegedly violated. If that person dies, the claim may survive for the benefit of the estate under applicable state law and may be asserted by the deceased person’s personal representative. Because Colon did not allege that she was Jones’s personal representative, the court dismissed Colon as a plaintiff. The court stated that plaintiffs may move for permission to amend the complaint with facts showing that Colon or another person is Jones’s personal representative.
The court also held that Murphy lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. Murphy did not allege that he was likely to be stopped, searched, or harassed again for violating the City’s social-distancing policies or for another reason. The court therefore granted the City’s motion to dismiss Murphy’s claims for injunctive relief.
Rule 12(b)(6) Issues
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a plausible claim. Applying that standard, the court ruled as follows.
Statute of limitations. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Murphy’s New York constitutional and state common-law claims as time-barred. The dismissed claims were claims five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, and eleven, including claims for false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, abuse of process, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision. The court rejected Murphy’s argument that the continuing-violation exception extended the filing period because he did not allege a qualifying discriminatory act within the limitations period.
Officer Dym. The court denied the motion to dismiss the claims against Dym. Although the complaint did not specify Dym’s exact actions on April 9, 2020, the court found that it plausibly alleged his personal involvement in the stop, harassment, use of force, and arrest.
Equal protection. The court denied the motion to dismiss Murphy’s equal-protection claims, except to the extent they relied on a “class-of-one” theory. The court found that the complaint plausibly alleged that the City enforced facially neutral social-distancing policies in an intentionally discriminatory, race-based manner against African-American and Latine communities. The complaint’s allegations included comparisons involving a gathering in Williamsburg and alleged disparities in enforcement across neighborhoods. The court stated that Murphy would eventually have to substantiate the allegation that racial discrimination motivated the defendants.
Due process. The court granted the motion to dismiss Murphy’s standalone substantive-due-process claim. It reasoned that the alleged conduct was covered by more specific constitutional protections, including the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause, so a separate substantive-due-process claim could not proceed.
Municipal liability. The court denied the motion to dismiss Murphy’s claims against the City under the municipal-liability rule from Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court found plausible allegations that the City had a widespread practice of targeting Black and Latine people in social-distancing enforcement and had failed to train or supervise officers despite an alleged history of misconduct. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court could consider the complaint’s cited reports, data, news articles, and other sources; the defendants could challenge the evidence later.
Disposition
The defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted as to all of Colon’s claims, as well as Murphy’s claims for equitable relief, New York constitutional violations, due process, and the specified state-law claims. The motion was denied as to all other claims. The court stated that Murphy may proceed on claims one, two, and three. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 58 and 61.
Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.